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This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context. 相似文献
3.
An Experimental Bribery Game 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Abbink Klaus; Irlenbusch Bernd; Renner Elke 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2002,18(2):428-454
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated. 相似文献
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The main statements in this article are taken from the report ?Untersuchung der Grundlagen und Entwicklungsperspektiven des Bankensektors in Deutschland ‘ for the Federal Ministry of Finance cf. www.diw.de/deutsch/produkte/publikationen/gutachten/aktuell/index.html. 《Economic Bulletin》2004,41(7):235-238
6.
This paper investigates how a development moratorium affects choices of development timing and land values in a framework
where both the value of developed property evolves stochastically and the development costs are fully irreversible. We assume
that a regulator initially announces that land is not allowed to be developed during a finite period of time in the future.
A developer, thus, must decide whether to develop land before the timing ordinance is imposed, or after it expires. The development
moratorium reduces the developer’s option value from waiting and, thus, accelerates development. We also use simulation analysis
to demonstrate how the other factors that relate to the demand and supply conditions of the real estate market affect this
accelerating effect. 相似文献
7.
The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights. 相似文献
8.
Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported. 相似文献
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Donald?F.?KuratkoEmail author Jeffrey?S.?Hornsby James?W.?Bishop 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2005,1(3):275-291
Through the development and extension of theories and scholars’ subsequent empirical analyses of significant, theoretically grounded research questions, the knowledge about corporate entrepreneurship (CE) and its successful use continues to advance. Moreover, the literature suggests important relationships between the corporate environment, managers’ entrepreneurial behavior and successful implementation of corporate entrepreneurship actions. In an attempt to test some of those relationships, we describe an empirical study of 523 managers that examines the relationships among the antecedents to managers’ entrepreneurial behavior, a decision to implement entrepreneurial actions, and resulting job satisfaction and reinforcement practices. 相似文献