Low price signals high capacity

We study pricing in a model where buyers are homogeneous and sellers have either capacity one or two. We show that if buyers observe prices but not capacities then an equilibrium exists where sellers of capacity two post lower prices than sellers of capacity one. The equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion.     

Price competition and market transparency: evidence from a random response technique

Surveys can increase market transparency when information asymmetries are present—but this will only happen when respondents answer questions truthfully. Sometimes, however, it might not be in the respondents’ best interest to provide truthful information on their firm or market. This will be especially true when other firms can exploit any information they provide. Understanding when, and under what conditions, respondents answer questions truthfully is important to researchers studying these markets and to policymakers using firm surveys to identify ways of improving the business environment. Using data from two countries in South Asia, this paper uses a random response technique to identify respondents that do not answer truthfully. We label these respondents as ‘reticent’. We show that respondents become more reticent when their firms face intense price competition. We argue that this is because intense competition gives respondents a greater incentive to misreport information to reduce market transparency.     

Markorientierte Kernkompetenzen — Integrativer Ansatz nicht empfehlenswert

In der Wirtschaftsrise suchen Unternehme nach neuen strategischen Marketingns?tzen. So macht der Begriff der sogenannten „Marktorientierten Kernkompetenzen“ die Runde, ein Konzept, das die klassische marktbasierte Sicht und die ressourcenbasierte Sicht des Strategischen Managements integrieren will. Dieser Beitrag zeigt, warum ein solche Ansatz für die Wirtschaft wenig zielührend ist.     

Overtime Work and Overtime Compensation in Germany

Sharing the available stock of work more fairly is a popular concern in the public policy debate. One policy proposal is to reduce overtime work in order to allow the employment of more people. This paper suggests that such a concept faces major problems. Using Germany as a case study, it is shown that the group of workers with the highest risks of becoming unemployed, namely the unskilled, also exhibit low levels of overtime work. Those who work overtime, namely the skilled, face excess demand on the labour market. Since skilled and unskilled workers are largely complements in production, a general reduction in overtime will lead to less production and hence also to a decline in the level of unskilled employment. The paper provides empirical support for this line of argument. It is also shown that paid overtime work has lost relative importance over time.     

Rational Underdevelopment*

We propose a two‐region two‐sector model of uneven development, where technological change benefits either the lagging or the leading region. In this framework interregional transfers may lead to persistent underdevelopment; by raising wages, transfers reduce the chance of the backward region adopting a new technology and taking off. Due to uncertainty about which region benefits from technological change, the backward region may rationally choose to remain underdeveloped, while the advanced region continues to pay transfers. The model provides a rationale for cases, such as Italy's Mezzogiorno, where the same rich region subsidizes the same poor region on a continuous basis.