INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

Business climate as a leading indicator? An empirical investigation for west Germany from 1978 to 1990

For twenty-five years now, the leading indicator “Business Climate” of the Ifo Institute has been applied in the Federal Republic of Germany. The intent of this note is to provide answers to two questions by means of econometric methods. The first question is: Is the business climate really a leading indicator? The second question is: How much time is the indicator ahead? For verification and in order to respond to both questions, the Granger causality test is used in the version of Hsiao.     

The Power of Networks: Integration and Financial Cooperative Performance

Abstract ** :  The purpose of this paper is to perform a cross‐country survey of the level of integration of systems of financial cooperatives (FC) and its effect on measures of performance. We develop a classification scheme based on a theoretical framework that builds on published work using transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain integration of large numbers of financial cooperatives into networks. We identify three critical levels of increasing integration we call respectively atomized systems, consensual networks and strategic networks. Further, we test some of the propositions that result from the theoretical framework on an international sample of financial cooperative systems. Based on this analysis we can conclude that: (i) Integration is less (more) important in developing (more developed) countries and for very small (large) financial cooperatives as a determinant of efficiency. However, integration tends to reduce volatility of efficiency and performance regardless of development. (ii) Integration appears to help control measure of managers' expense preferences that tend to affect performance of FC. (iii) Despite high costs of running hub‐like organizations in highly integrated system, these systems economize in bounded rationality and operate at lower costs than less integrated systems.     

Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.     

Uncertain spatial demand and price flexibility: A state space approach to duopoly

Sufficient conditions for a unique price equilibrium, in terms of the uncertainty distribution and the state contingent consumer distributions, are given for spatial duopoly. Also considered are efficiency and endogenous locations for the symmetric case and comparative statics on price flexibility.     

Validity — the quest for reality in quantitative and qualitative research

It has been argued that fundamentally different methodological approaches have made for ‘two sociologies’. This view has obscured the fact that the problem of validity has to be tackled independently of any specific methodological premises because of the textuality of sociological data. This does not necessarily imply, however, a single, unified strategy for validity testing. In this paper, some basic theoretical presuppositions underlying the approach to validity testing in quantitative research will be contrasted with the strategies offered by Max Weber's methodological writings on the ideal type. It is argued that the use of ideal typical constructs in qualitative research (exemplified by patient's illness careers) allows systematic validity testing despite the important differences in the conceptualization of social reality which is used in quantitative research, thus serving the purpose of any empirical sociological research, that is, to gain valid insight into societies' concrete reality.     

People,Actors, and the Humanizing of Institutional Theory

In much contemporary institutional scholarship, the term ‘actor’ is used as a shorthand for any entity imbued with agency. Talking about actors in institutions thus serves the necessity of allocating agency before returning to the analysis of institutional structures and processes. We find this approach to actorhood limiting, conceptually and normatively. Grounded in the perspective of pragmatist phenomenology, we assert the need for distinguishing between persons and actors, and the value of integrating the person into institutional analysis. We conceive of persons as humans with a reflective capacity and sense of self, who engage with multiple institutions through the performance of institutional roles. People may acquire actorhood by temporarily aligning their self with what is expected from a particular actor-role in an institutional order. Conversely, institutions enter people’s lifeworld as they are personified in people’s social performances. We outline this perspective and examine conceptual and normative implications that arise from the integration of human experience in institutional analysis.     

HOW IMPORTANT ARE ENDOGENOUS PEER EFFECTS IN GROUP LENDING? ESTIMATING A STATIC GAME OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

We quantify the importance of endogenous peer effects in group lending programs by estimating a static game of incomplete information. Endogenous peer effects describe how one's behavior is affected by the behavior of her peers. Using a rich dataset from a group lending program in India, our empirical analysis presents a robust finding of large peer effects. The preferred model suggests that the probability of a member making a full repayment would be 12 percentage points higher if all the fellow members were to make full repayment compared with a scenario in which none of the other members repay in full. We find that peer effects would be overestimated without controlling for unobserved group heterogeneity and that inconsistencies exist in the estimated effects of other variables without modeling peer effects and unobserved heterogeneity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.