Can Federal Grants Mitigate Social Competition?

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobilityof factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transferprograms. This article investigates the possibility to achieveby means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocationof factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presenceof factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin(1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferencesfor redistribution. We first investigate a simple process inwhich the federal authority progressively raises the matchinggrants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and alldistricts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfersall around. This process is shown to increase efficiency ofboth production and redistribution. However, it does not guaranteethat all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistributionis attained. Assuming complete information among districts,we derive the willingness of each district to match the contributionof other districts and we show that the aggregate willingnessto pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficientlevel of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factorsare achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for thematching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcomeand guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification:H23, H70)     

Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare

This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline, as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a “minimum winning coalition” of regions (selective rent-diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed.     

Technical and vocational teaching and training in Gabon: how future teachers build their vocational identity?

The professionalism of teachers is based on three levels of expertise: mastering academic knowledge, mastering the teaching of this knowledge and mastering the role played by teachers in schools. For each of these levels, each student during the teacher training courses has his own understanding. This understanding influences their perception of the job of teacher and thus their attitude towards their training. Efficiency of this training could be evaluated through the evolution of this understanding. The experimental part of this study will involve looking at this evolution with students from the ENSET in Libreville at the beginning of the training course, the end of the first cycle and the end of the second cycle. Data collected shows that training does not really produce the desired results for a university vocational teacher training course for technology education.     

Design of an interrelated quality system for a single product manufacturing process with assembly

The design of a single product manufacturing system with assembly is considered. The processing is on a lot-by-lot basis with the lot size fixed. The decision variables include interrelated single sampling plans, manufacturing process quality levels, incoming raw material quality levels and assembly process quality levels. A solution procedure is given to minimize the expected total of the costs associated with the quality of the finished product subject to a limit on the Average Outgoing Quality Limit of the finished product. An example is provided.     

Food safety and product liability

This paper focuses on the U.S. product liability system for food poisoning cases and makes six key points. First, current legal incentives to produce safer food are weak, though slightly stronger in outbreak situations and in markets where foodborne illness can be more easily traced to individual firms. Far less than 0.01% of cases are litigated and even fewer are paid compensation. Second, even if potential plaintiffs can overcome the high information and transaction costs necessary to file lawsuits, monetary compensation provides only weak incentives to pursue litigation. Firms paid compensation in 56% of the 294 cases examined in this study and the median compensation was only $2,000 before legal fees. Third, indirect incentives for firms may be important and deserve more research. For example, firms may be influenced by costly settlements and decisions against other firms in the same industry. Fourth, confidential settlements, health insurance, and product liability insurance distort legal incentives to produce safer food. Fifth, the ambiguity about whether microbial contamination is “natural” or an “adulterant” hinders the legal system from effectively dealing with food safety issues. Sixth, a brief comparison of the incentives from U.S. and English legal systems suggests that more research is needed to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and relative impact of each country's legal system on the incentives to produce safer food.     

Supply structure: The pendulum in action

Using an in-depth longitudinal case study based on an “historical retrospective”, this article focuses on how some factors (“drivers”) set into motion the pendulum of change in supply structures, a research theme neglected in the supply field. It examines, over a 20-year period, the changes made to the supply structure of a well-known organization. The data comes mainly from: (a) semi-structured interviews with 21 managers and professionals within eight operating units, and (b) documentary analyses of the archives. This article shows how to map structural changes of the supply function, while explaining the nature and the causes of these changes. Understanding the pendulum movement from one supply structure to another can be very valuable, as well for academics as for managers.