The role of preconceived ideas in macroeconomic policy: Japan's experiences in two deflationary periods

This paper examines the role of misleading economic ideas that most likely promoted the economic disasters of the two deflationary periods in Japanese economic history. Misleading ideas deepened the depression during the interwar years, and erroneous thinking has prolonged the stagnation of the Japanese economy since the 1990s. While the current framework of political economy is based on the self-interest of political agents as well as of voters, we highlight the role of ideas in policy making, in particular, in the field of macroeconomy where the incidence of a particular policy is not clear to the public. Using two significant examples, this paper illustrates the role of preconceived ideas, in contrast to economic interests, as dominant forces influencing economic policy making.     

Trade in Capital Goods and International Co-movements of Macroeconomic Variables

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the causes of international co-movements of macroeconomic variables. In particular, existing real business cycle models predict cross-country consumption correlations to be higher than in the actual data, cross-country output correlations to be lower than in the actual data, and cross-country consumption correlations to be relatively higher than the output correlations. We show that cross-country correlations of consumption, investment, employment and output predicted by a standard international real business cycle model are highly sensitive to the share of capital goods in total trade. Our calibrated model shows that when capital goods account for a share of total traded goods greater than 50%, the apparent discrepancy between the data and the simulations is resolved.

Retail Market Power in a Shopping Basket Model of Supermarket Competition

Supermarket retailers typically operate with relatively low margins, suggesting a highly competitive retail environment. However, despite the fact that consumers purchase an entire shopping basket at a time from supermarkets, this evidence is largely based on models of retail competition with single-category purchases. In this paper, we develop and test an empirical model of retail price competition that explicitly accounts for the effect of demand complementarity among items in consumer shopping baskets. Relative to the case where consumers purchase products with independent demands, we demonstrate that equilibrium prices are higher for all items when retailers take demand-complementarity into account. Our findings indicate that non-price strategies intended to encourage complementarity, such as co-merchandising, strategic shelf-positioning, or featuring complementary goods tend to soften price competition, and lead to higher equilibrium prices.     

Measuring the Benefits of Neighbourhood Park Amenities: Application and Comparison of Spatial Hedonic Approaches

The hedonic price method was used to estimate the influence of parks on the rental prices of single-room dwellings in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo, Japan. A simple least squares method is not optimal when the data set contains spatial autocorrelation. To improve the accuracy of estimates, we employed spatial autoregression and kriging models, resulting in a higher validity of the spatial models compared to the least squares model. Kriging models were superior to others particularly in terms of prediction accuracy, indicating that these models should be employed if the objective is superior prediction rather than estimation. The results showed that the effect of parks on property values varied with the buffer distance and park size.     

Domestic Unionization and the Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy

This paper examines the effect of lobbying by a labor union and its parent firm on the argument for strategic export policy in a third market-unionized duopoly. The lobbying-induced export policy frequently deteriorates domestic welfare as compared with free trade. It is true that the politically-determined export policy can improve domestic welfare if the union's bargaining power is strong and the domestic government's responsiveness to political contributions is weak. However, even if the conditions are met, implementing the lobbying-induced export policy will not enhance domestic welfare more than improving labor–management relations. Moreover, the improvement of their relations will be hampered by the opportunity of their lobbying. These results indicate that strategic export policy toward a unionized duopoly should be restrained in light of political economy.