A supply chain-transport supernetwork equilibrium model with the behaviour of freight carriers

This paper presents a supernetwork equilibrium model integrating supply chain networks with a transport network, namely, a supply chain-transport supernetwork equilibrium model. The model takes into account the behaviour of freight carriers and transport network users to endogenously determine the transport costs generated in the supply chain networks. The interaction between transport network and supply chain networks can also be examined. Results of the numerical tests reveal that the improvement of transport network could enhance the efficiency of supply chain networks. The paper makes contributions to modelling of supply chain networks as well as to that of transport networks.     

An existence theorem for Cournot–Walras equilibria in a monopolistically competitive economy

We establish an existence theorem for Cournot–Walras equilibria in a monopolistically competitive economy. Instead of the traditional approach which depends on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we employ the theories of aggregative games and best reply potential games. We show that, if there exists a representative consumer, under some conditions on preferences and production technologies, the profit maximization game is a (pseudo) best reply potential game. Hence, the existence of the equilibria is proved independently of the well known convex-valued assumption on the best responses. Although our assumptions result in the additive separability on a utility function of a representative consumer, the existence of increasing returns and indivisible productions can be allowed. In our model, it is shown that the game played by firms exhibits strategic substitutes whether the products of firms are substitutes or complements, and this plays an important role for the existence of the equilibria.     

Comparing Open-loop With Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games

We consider a class of differential games with transition equations that are homogeneous of degree one. For any game G with a discount rate r , consider a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) with strategies that are linear in the state variables. We show that the time paths of the control variables of this equilibrium constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game G , which differs from G only in that its rate of discount r is equal to r plus a suitably chosen constant. In the context of a resource depletion game, this implies that the open-loop solution is more conservationist.
JEL Classification Nos.: C72, C73, Q30.     

Equilibrium dynamics in discrete-time endogenous growth models with social constant returns

The existing literature establishes possibilities of local determinacy and dynamic indeterminacy in continuous-time two-sector models of endogenous growth with social constant returns. The necessary and sufficient condition for local determinacy is that the factor intensity rankings of the two sectors are consistent in the private/physical and social/value sense. The necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic indeterminacy is that the final (consumable) good sector is human (pure) capital intensive in the private sense but physical (consumable) capital intensive in the social sense. This paper re-examines the dynamic properties in a discrete-time endogenous growth framework and finds that conventional propositions obtained in continuous time need not be valid. It is shown that the established necessary and sufficient conditions on factor intensity rankings for local determinacy and dynamic indeterminacy are neither sufficient nor necessary, as the magnitudes of time preference and capital depreciation rates both play essential roles. We have benefitted from discussion with Robert Becker, Eric Bond, Michael Kaganovich, Karl Shell and participants of the Midwest Macroeconomic Conference in Chicago and the Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Meetings at Indiana University. The fourth author acknowledges financial support from the Institute of Economics and Business Administration of Kobe University and the Institute of Economic Research of Kyoto University to enable this international collaboration.     

Peliosis of the spleen with intraperitoneal hemorrhage

We encountered a patient with steroidrelated peliosis of the spleen, a rare disease characterized by multiple blood-filled cavities in the splenic parenchyma, with spontaneous intraperitoneal hemorrhage. The ultrasonographic, computed tomographic, and angiographic images were compared with pathologic findings of the material obtained surgically.     

Quasi-Competitive Cournot Oligopoly with Product Differentiation and Symmetric Firms

Since Vives (1984 ), Cheng (1985 ) and Okuguchi (1987 ), the equilibria in Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation have been known to differ. Okuguchi (2005 ) has shown that Bertrand price‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms is quasi‐competitive but not perfectly competitive in the limit state of infinite number of firms. This paper formulates and analyzes two types of Cournot output‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms, in one of which symmetric firms producing the same goods are assumed to collude, and in the other, collusion is ruled out. The limit states are shown to be different in two oligopolies but they are both quasi‐competitive.     

Indeterminacy in a dynamic two-country model

The purpose of this paper is to show that indeterminacy can arise in a simple competitive two-country dynamic model of international trade, free of externalities, imperfect competition, and government intervention. This seemingly surprising result is based on an assumption that there is no international credit market. As will be shown later, the assumption implies that dynamic equilibrium paths of our two-country, therefore heterogeneous consumer, model are not generally Pareto-optimal.The paper is dedicated to Professor Mukul Majumdar on the occasion of his 60th birthday with great respect. We thank Takashi Kamihigashi, Tapan Mitra and Makoto Yano for their useful comments on the earlier version of this paper.     

Multiple equilibria arising from donor’s aid policy in economic development

This paper presents a neoclassical growth model comprising education and child labor with a focus on developing and aid-receiving countries to demonstrate cyclical growth and bifurcation in economic development. The appearance of multiple equilibria has often been attributed to the internal affairs of recipient countries, such as technology in production, subsistence minimum in consumption, and liquidity constraints in investment. The main argument of this paper is that the aid allocation policy employed by donor countries, thereby the motive of aid-providers, leads to divaricated and cyclical development in the recipient countries.     

International Trade and Volume Patterns under Quasilinear Preferences

We formally analyze the pattern and volume of trade by embedding quasilinear preferences in the standard perfectly competitive, two‐factor, two‐good, two‐country trade model. Quasilinear preferences deliver a natural partition of the two goods into a luxury and a necessity, and preserve the validity of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theorems. In addition, the predicted factor content of trade under quasilinear preferences is smaller (larger) than the predicted factor content of trade under homothetic preferences if and only if the luxury good is capital (labor) intensive. This result offers a novel explanation for the “missing‐trade” mystery.