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Despite the introduction of sophisticated stock market indices, investors often trade portfolios of the flawed indices to change their exposure to the market. In this study, we show that these transactions cause significant mispricing in individual stocks, especially during periods of significant market movement. As an influential, albeit flawed, stock index, we focus on the Nikkei 225. We find index constituents that are excessively weighted on the index, experience buying (selling) pressure when the stock market surges (falls), and experience price corrections after such periods of change. In contrast, non-constituent stocks do not experience such trading pressure. 相似文献
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Shinichi Yamaguchi Kotaro Iyanaga Hirohide Sakaguchi Tatsuo Tanaka 《The Review of Socionetwork Strategies》2017,11(2):95-110
In this paper, we discuss the substitution effects between mobile games and console games. We estimate such effects by a fixed-effect regression with instrumental variables using panel data of about 100,000 observations. The results showed that the substitution effects of playing smart devices on 3DS, Wii, and PSP were recognizable, but did not have significant effects on PS3, and the substitution effects on PSP were very small. Therefore, mobile games had a substitution effect on casual console games, or on console games in which the play situation resembled mobile games. In addition, the substitution effects were at most about 0.1. The substitution effects were small. Our results indicate that mobile games represent the pioneers in the new market of gaming at least during our observation period. But new games and traditional games will coexist for a while. 相似文献
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Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kotaro Suzumura 《Economic journal (London, England)》1999,109(455):204-220
Two distinct approaches can be identified in the new welfare economics. The school of thought based on the compensation principles attempted to see what can be said about social welfare without making interpersonal comparisons of well-being by extending the applicability of the Pareto principle through hypothetical compensatory payments between gainers and losers. The Bergson-Samuelson school of thought introduced the social welfare function as a formal method of introducing a Pareto-inclusive ethical belief on social welfare, whose policy implications we should theoretically explore. Synthesising these two approaches, this paper identifies a condition under which the new welfare economics is logically impeccable. 相似文献
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This paper provides a computational market model with technological competitions among standards and presents simulations
of various scenarios concerning standardization problems. The market model has three features: (1) economic entities such
as consumers and firms are regarded as autonomous agents; (2) micro interactions among consumer agents or firm agents have
essential mechanisms interpretable in real markets; and (3) consumers’ preferences and firms’ technologies co-affect their
evolutionary behavior. In recent years, consumers have experienced various inconveniences from de facto competition based
on a market mechanism. Standardization communities or committees such as the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) need to design a compatible standard or a de jure standard in
a market. However, it is difficult for market designers to decide a method or timing for the standardization. Here, by introducing
a novel technique used in agent-based social simulation (ABSS), which we call “scenario analysis,” we aim to support such
decision making. Scenario analysis provides the possible market changes that can occur following implementation of a design
policy under a specific market situation and the market mechanisms that generate these market changes. 相似文献
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Symmetric Cournot oligopoly and economic welfare: a synthesis 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary Recently, Mankiw-Whinston (1986) and Suzumura-Kiyono (1987) have shown that socially excessive firm entry occurs in unregulated oligopoly. This paper extends this excess entry results by looking into strategic aspects of costreducing R&D investment that creates incentives towards socially excessive investments. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to enter the market. In the second stage, firms make a commitment to cost-reducing R&D investment. In the third stage, firms compete in output quantities. It is shown that the excess entry holds even in the presence of strategic commitments.This is the synthesized version of the two earlier papers, Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1988) and Suzumura (1991). We are grateful to Professors J. Brander, D. Cass, M. Majumdar, A. Postlewaite, J. Richmond, A. Sandmo, B. Spencer and J. Vickers for their helpful comments and discussions on earlier drafts. Needless to say, they should not be held responsible for any remaining defects. Financial supports from the Japan Center for Economic Research, Tokyo Center for Economic Research, the Japanese Ministry of Education, and the Institute for Monetary and Economic Research, the Bank of Japan are gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献