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51.
Im Februar 2006 hat die Bundesregierung ein Gesetz zur Versch?rfung von Finanzkontrollen verabschiedet. Welche Rolle spielen
Sanktionen im Kalkül von Steuerhinterziehern? Welche Kosten-Nutzen-Berechnungen stellen Steuerbetrüger an?
Prof. Dr. Dieter Cansier, 65, lehrte Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzwissenschaft, an der Universit?t Tübingen. 相似文献
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Gerald H Kramer 《Journal of Economic Theory》1978,19(2):565-567
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M. Borchert K. Brandt A. Woll D. Eckel W. Meißner H. Gröner J. Klaus A. Kausel H. Kramer F. H. Fleck E. Küng A. Graziani G. Hedtkamp M. Drennig J. H. Furth Monika Streissler E. Kaufer C. -A. Andreae F. Ferschl G. Kade E. F. Čada 《Journal of Economics》1968,28(2):257-304
Ohne Zusammenfassung 相似文献
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This paper bridges the theoretical and empirical literatures on the role of preference heterogeneity in characterizing externalities related to disease transmission. We use a theoretical structure similar to locational sorting models, which characterize equilibria in terms of marginal individuals who are indifferent between locations. In our case, the ‘locations’ are binary, consisting of whether or not to take a discrete preventative action. Individual heterogeneity arises in this structure due to variation in the costs and disutility associated with prevention. We demonstrate application of this approach in the context of participation in insecticide-based indoor residual spraying programs for malaria control in northern Uganda. We identify the parameters of our theoretical model using a stated preference choice experiment combined with estimates from published epidemiological studies. The model implies that Pigovian subsidies for participation in this context should decrease household malaria risk by 19–25%. Our approach can be applied to other bioeconomic externalities with spillovers from discrete preventative actions, including agricultural pest management and the control of pest infestations and invasive species. 相似文献
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Kramer RM 《Harvard business review》2003,81(10):58-66, 136
The past decade may well be remembered as the era of the high-flying, aggressive leader. Corner-office titans like Kenneth Lay, Dennis Kozlowski, and Bernard Ebbers graced the covers of business magazines. They captured the public's fascination with their bold business moves and charismatic sound bites. Then scandal set in, and the stars fell to earth. In this article, social psychologist Roderick M. Kramer asks an important question: Why do so many leaders--not just in business, but also in politics, religion, and the media--display remarkable adeptness and ability while courting power, only to engage in even more remarkable bouts of folly once that power has been secured? Kramer, who has spent most of his career researching how leaders get to the top, says there is something about the process of becoming a leader that changes people in profound ways. The systems through which we select our leaders force executives to sacrifice the attitudes and behaviors that are essential to their survival once they have reached the top. Society has learned to consider risk taking and rule breaking as markers of good leadership. As a result, CEOs and other leaders lack the modesty and prudence needed to cope with the rewards and trappings of power. They come to believe that normal limits don't apply to them and that they are entitled to any spoils they can seize. The leaders who do remain grounded--who get to the top and stay there--exhibit five common psychological and behavioral habits: They simplify their lives, remaining humble and "awfully ordinary." They shine a light on their weaknesses instead of trying to cover them up. They float trial balloons to uncover the truth and prepare for the unexpected. They sweat the small stuff. And they reflect more, not less. 相似文献
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Kramer RM 《Harvard business review》2002,80(7):62-9, 124
On September 11, 2001, in the space of a few horrific minutes, Americans realized the fragility of trust. The country's evident vulnerability to deadly terrorism rocked our faith in the systems we rely on for security. Our trust was shaken again only a few months later with the stunning collapse of Enron, forcing us to question many of the methods and assumptions underpinning the way we work. These two crises are obviously very different, yet both serve as reminders of the perils of trusting too much. The abiding belief that trust is a strength now seems dangerously naive. This new doubtfulness runs contrary to most management literature, which has traditionally touted trust as an organizational asset. It's an easy case to make. When there are high levels of trust, employees can fully commit themselves to the organization because they can be confident that their efforts will be recognized and rewarded. Trust also means that leaders don't have to worry so much about putting the right spin on things. They can act and speak forthrightly and focus on essentials. In short, trust is an organizational superglue. Nevertheless, two decades of research on trust and cooperation in organizations have convinced social psychologist Roderick Kramer that--despite its costs--distrust can be beneficial in the workplace. Kramer has observed that a moderate form of suspicion, which he calls prudent paranoia, can in many cases prove highly beneficial to the distrustful individual or organization. In this article, he describes situations in which prudent paranoia makes sense and shows how, when properly deployed, it can serve as a powerful morale booster--even a competitive weapon--for organizations. 相似文献
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