Place Meanings Ascribed to Marine Settings: The Case of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park

Using data collected from in-depth interviews of recreational visitors to Australia's Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, place-related meanings ascribed to a marine environment are described. The usefulness of using symbolic interactionism to understand the creation of these meanings is also assessed. Ten meaning-themes emerged (aesthetic beauty, lack of built infrastructure/pristine environment, abundance and diversity of coral and other wildlife, unique natural resource, facilitation of desired recreation activity, safety and accessibility, curiosity and exploration, sense of connection to the natural world, escape from the everyday, and experiences with family and friends), and evidence supporting the utility of symbolic interactionism was identified. Using these findings, researchers may be better able to identify place meanings and the processes that create them.     

Understanding the Role of Identity in the Constraint Negotiation Process

Sociological theory related to identity was adapted to explore the influence of identity on respondents’ perceived leisure constraints and constraint negotiation. We hypothesized that perceived constraints to recreational golf and efforts to negotiate constraints would be predicted by the degree to which respondents embraced their leisure-related identity of “golfer.” It was also hypothesized that the perception of constraints and constraint negotiation would depend upon the degree to which respondents perceive that the identities they embrace facilitate or conflict. Findings showed support for the hypothesized model.     

Strategic Pricing Behavior under Asset Value Maximization

In this paper, we empirically evaluate strategic pricing behavior and shareholder delegation of financial market objectives in the U.S. butter and margarine market. Shareholders are assumed to maximize the value of firm assets according to a certainty equivalent capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The delegation setup instructs managers to maximize a linear combination of firm profits and shareholder equity values. A key result from the analysis is that a test of financial market influences cannot be rejected in the product market for butter and margarine. Product market competition is best described using a conjectural variation model of industrial organization. Estimates of Lerner Indexes suggest significant market power and counterfactual simulations point toward significant biases in estimated Lerner Indexes when capital market dimensions are ignored or if the wrong market structure is assumed. Dans le présent article, nous avons effectué l'évaluation empirique de comportements stratégiques dans la détermination des prix et la délégation d'objectifs financiers de la part d'actionnaires sur le marchéétatsunien du beurre et de la margarine. Nous avons supposé que les actionnaires maximisent la valeur de l'actif d'une firme selon l'équivalent certain du modèle d'évaluation des actifs financiers (MEDAF). La structure de la délégation amène les gestionnaires à maximiser une combinaison linéaire des profits de la firme et de la valeur nette des actions. L'un des principaux résultats de l'analyse est qu'un test des influences du marché des capitaux sur le marché des produits ne peut être rejeté pour le cas du beurre et de la margarine. La concurrence sur le marché des produits est plus adéquatement caractérisée par un modèle d'organisation industrielle à variations conjecturales. Les estimations de l'indice de Lerner ont indiqué la présence de pouvoir de marché, et les simulations contrefactuelles ont montré des biais significatifs dans les valeurs estimées des indices de Lerner lorsque l'on ne tient pas compte du marché des capitaux ou que l'on suppose une structure de marché erronée.     

Entry threat,entry delay,and Internet speed: The timing of the U.S. broadband rollout

In a rapidly growing industry, potential entrants strategically choose which local markets to enter. Facing the threat of additional entrants, a potential entrant may lower its expectation of future profits and delay entry into a local market, or it may accelerate entry due to preemptive motives. Using the evolution of local market structures of broadband Internet service providers from 1999 to 2007, we find that the former effect dominates the latter after allowing for spatial correlation across markets and accounting for endogenous market structure. On average, it takes 2 years longer for threatened markets to receive their first broadband entrant. Moreover, this entry delay has long‐run negative implications for the divergence of the U.S. broadband infrastructure: 1 year of entry delay translates into an 11% decrease on average present‐day download speeds.     

Cutting out the middle-man: The case for direct business involvement in environmental justice

In recent years, environmental concerns have become the first priority for socially-conscious corporations. This article describes the history of the environmental justice movement and its philosophical differences with the mainstream environmental movement. Environmental justice activists allege that the mainstream environmental movement marginalizes the environmental interests of the poor and people of color. Herein, we provide guidance for environmentally-conscious corporations that wish to avoid repeating the same ethical errors.     

MARKET POWER,BANK MEGAMERGERS,AND THE WELFARE OF BANK BORROWERS

We assess the effects on the welfare of corporate borrowers of the recent wave of bank consolidations in the United States that has produced a small number of very large banks. Our evidence from a sample of more than 3,000 commercial borrowers from banks involved in large mergers indicates that the wealth effects on these borrowers are highly negative, statistically significant, and economically important. These negative investor perceptions seem to be driven largely by the expectation of changes in banks’ market power resulting from the mergers.     

Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

We offer a first formal analysis of auctioning retaliation rights within the WTO. We show that the auctions exhibit externalities among bidders, and we characterize equilibrium bidder behavior under alternative auction formats. If the violating country is prevented from bidding to retire the right of retaliation against it, then the possibility of “auction failure” arises, whereby no bids are made despite positive valuation by bidders. If the violating country is instead permitted to bid, then auction failure is precluded, and indeed the right of retaliation is always retired. We evaluate these different auction formats from normative (revenue, compliance, efficiency) standpoints.     

An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case of state trading enterprises

A central result in the theoretical literature on strategic trade is the ‘rent-shifting hypothesis’, the idea that government’s can employ trade policy as a precommitment device to transfer profit from foreign to domestic firms. To our knowledge, however, the rent-shifting hypothesis remains untested empirically. This paper constructs a theory-based empirical test of rent-shifting behavior that relies on observations of government precommitment variables employed through State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The analysis applies data on the delayed producer payment structure of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and examines its merits as a rent-shifting mechanism in the international durum market. The model fails to reject the hypothesis that the CWB utilizes a pre-commitment mechanism in the international durum market and several nonparametric tests confirm that the observed transfer payments set by the CWB are consistent with rent-shifting behavior in the 1972-95 pre-WTO period.