Productive play time: the effect of practice on consumer demand for hedonic experiences

In this paper we explain how practice, prior knowledge and task difficulty interact to affect demand for hedonic experiences. As predicted by the human capital model, we propose that the key determinant of demand for hedonic experiences is the increase in performance efficiency that can be gained through practice. In addition, we argue that the nature of the effect of practice is distinctly different in hedonic consumption, compared to utilitarian consumption. Specifically, for hedonic experiences, practice allows consumers to extract greater value within a given period of time, rather than reduce the amount of time spent on a (utilitarian) task. Finally, we argue that if changes in performance efficiency across repeated hedonic experiences adhere to the power law of practice, then both prior knowledge and task difficulty will be important moderators of the main effect of practice on demand. These predictions are tested in two experiments that use an online panel to examine consumer demand for videogames.     

Regime switching and oligopsony power: the case of U.S. beef processing

In this article, we estimate a model of oligopsony behavior under imperfect monitoring of rival actions to analyze weekly marketing margin data for the U.S. beef packing industry. Oligopsonists are hypothesized to follow a discontinuous pricing strategy in equilibrium, and we focus on shocks in the normal throughput of supply as a potential catalyst for regime switching between cooperative and noncooperative phases. We adopt an algorithm developed by Bellone (2005) that relies on Hamilton’s (1989) multivariate first‐order Markov process to test for the cooperative/noncooperative switching behavior. We find strong evidence that links switching conduct by packers to disruptions in coordinating the derived demands for processed beef with the supply of live cattle. Once switched, cooperative regimes lasted an average of 21 weeks, while noncooperative regimes averaged 33 weeks. The average marketing margin for processed beef was 68% lower in the noncooperative regimes compared to the cooperative regimes. This led to an annual average increase in profits of 408 million dollars to the beef packing industry and about an 8–9% reduction in live cattle prices.     

Strategic export subsidies and reciprocal trade agreements: The natural monopoly case

Why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT? In this paper, we emphasize that subsidy competition between governments can serve to coordinate the entry decisions of firms, finding that consumers in the importing countries may suffer if the coordination afforded exporters by government subsidy programs does more to prevent entry than to promote it. In such circumstances, we show that the existence of export subsidy programs can lead to inefficiencies, and importing countries and the world as a whole can be better off when such programs are banned.     

A Switching Regime Approach to Measuring the Effects of Technological Change in Ocean Shipping

this study examines the dramatic change in production technology of the U.S. ocean liner shipping industry over the period 1971 through 1982 using panel data on 15 subsidized U.S.-flag liner firms. To estimate the changes in the production function due to the new technology, the switching regime method of Goldfeld and Quandt is applied to a translog variable profit function. Three regimes based on the proportion of the new technology reflected in a firm's fleet are identified. The constant returns to scale fleet size more than doubles across the three regimes.     

A commentary on “Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Causes of U.S. Commercial Bank Failures This Time Around”

Cole and White (J Financ Serv Res 2012) show that small banks which failed during the financial crisis–like small banks which faile in previous crises–tended to have high concentration of loans financing commercial real estate and real estate development several years before failure. In contrast, large banks failed during the financial crisis due to the novel strategy of investing in poorly underwritten subprime mortgages. The fact that large banks fail as a resut of changing business models while small banks fail for predictable reasons makes justifies a heightened level of supervision of large banks (consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act).     

Factors influencing United States comparative advantage

One of the more famous results in international trade is Leontief's demonstration that the conventional wisdom of trade theory—the two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model, coupled with the empirical judgement that the U.S. is capital-rich—does not appear to provide an explanation of the composition of U.S. trade. A major conclusion of many recent studies is that an adequate model of comparative advantage will be, of necessity, a multi-factor one. This paper examines the implications of a modified multi-factor-proportions model by measuring the simultaneous impact of a variety of factor intensities on the comparative advantage of all U.S. (trading) industries, classified and disaggregated by the 1958 input-output table. The novelty of the study lies in using a binary measure of comparative advantage. In order to by-pass several econometric difficulties, logit analysis is used to estimate the model. The principal conclusion of the paper is that capital-intensity has a significantly positive impact on the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing industries and, therefore, that the U.S. is, in fact, relatively capital-rich.     

A personal construct analysis of adaptive selling and sales experience

Customer orientation is a key to successful marketing strategies. In personal selling, customer orientation has been shown to be related to the quality of the customer-salesperson relationship (Saxe & Weitz, 1978). Adaptive selling (Weitz, Sujan, & Sujan, 1986) is a theoretical perspective that suggests sales performance is related to salespeople's ability to shift their customer orientation, by adapting their behavior to different customers in different situations. This article presents personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955) as a framework for understanding how sales personnel perceive and adapt to customers. An interview technique known as laddering (Gutman, 1982; Hinkle, 1965) is used to elicit these constructs from sales personnel. Results of the interviews are compared across levels of sales experience. Consistent with the Sujan, Sujan, and Bettman (1988) findings relating sales effectiveness and breadth of knowledge structures, we find that the number of years of sales experience is related to the breadth of constructs obtained from the laddering interviews. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The prospects for OPEC: A critical survey of models of the world oil market

The paper critically surveys seven recent models of the world oil market and their evaluations of the prospects for OPEC: Blitzer-Meeraus-Stoutjesdijk, Bohi-Russell, the U.S. Federal Energy Administration, Kennedy, Kalymon, Levy and Nordhaus. After a brief discussion of the basic approaches to the problem, we examine the model specifications in some detail. The principal contributions and conclusions are summarized, as are the main limitations of these models. We conclude with some suggestions of the most promising areas for future research.     

Collusion and Price Rigidity

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria, wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each firm is strictly increasing in its cost level: such "fully sorting" schemes offer efficiency benefits, as they ensure that the lowest-cost firm makes the current sale, but they also imply an informational cost (distorted pricing and/or equilibrium-path price wars), since a higher-cost firm must be deterred from mimicking a lower-cost firm by charging a lower price. A rigid-pricing scheme, where a firm's collusive price is independent of its current cost position, sacrifices efficiency benefits but also diminishes the informational cost. For a wide range of settings, the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires (i) the absence of equilibrium-path price wars and (ii) a rigid price. If firms are sufficiently impatient, however, the rigid-pricing scheme cannot be enforced, and the collusive price of lower-cost firms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat. When the model is modified to include i.i.d. public demand shocks, the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a firm's lower-cost realization may occur only when current demand is high.