State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

Daily mutual fund flows and redemption policies

We examine how redemption policies affect daily fund flows in open-end mutual funds. Since short-term trading of fund shares, as manifested in daily fund flows, can have an adverse impact on returns to the fund’s shareholders, mutual funds might find it desirable to discourage short-term trading through the use of redemption fees. However, if daily fund flows are due to fund shareholders’ legitimate liquidity demands, the redemption fee would have little effect on daily fund flows and possibly adversely affect fund shareholders by imposing a liquidity cost on them. We find that the likelihood of a fund charging a redemption fee is largely a function of its overall fee structure. We also use a sample of funds that imposed redemption fees to examine whether the distribution of daily fund flows changes after the initiation of the redemption fee. We find that the redemption fee is an effective tool in controlling the volatility of fund flows.     

Trust, reputation and relationships in grazing rights markets: An experimental economic study

Trust is frequently a requirement for economic exchanges and the management of natural resources. Providing public information on past actions can promote trust through the formation of reputations. We developed an economic experiment to test whether a formal reputation mechanism could facilitate trusting relationships in the tradable grazing rights markets. Providing information to create formal public reputations for market participants did not increase the overall efficiency of the market. However, it did result in greater equality of income between partners, suggesting that participants showed more concern for their partners when they knew they would be rated. Even with public reputation information, bilateral relationships remained central to the market. Market failures in existing grazing rights markets may be better addressed by measures to increase communication between partners rather than simply relying on a formal reputation mechanism.     

The Dilemmas of Technology: A Review Article

During the 1990s, all of the European transition economies (TE) experienced a major recession and suffered from the explosion of income inequality. However, distribution of income between labor and capital differed greatly from one group of post-communist countries to another. The paper discusses and analyzes linkages between models of capitalism that emerged in former communist countries in the 1990s and the outcome of capitalist transition for labor in terms of income distribution and inequality. It is based on the estimates of the Marxian rate of exploitation and other indicators of labor income performance during the reform period.     

COMET: A medium-term macroeconomic model for the European economic community

COMET is a macroeconomic medium-term model for the European Economic Community. It basically consists of eight similarly specified country models which are linked by bilateral trade equations and equations specifying the formation of import and export prices. The medium-term nature is reflected in the role played by the degree of capacity utilization. Section 2 discusses the basic (structural) assumptions of the model, section 3 the performance of the model as a whole.     

Can Economists Forecast Exchange Rates? The Debate Re‐Visited: The Case of the USD/GBP Market

In the debate on forecasting exchange rates, critics claimed that traditional macroeconomic models could not outperform a random walk in post‐sample forecasts. Perceived deficiencies include inadequate allowance for simultaneity, and expectations hypotheses inconsistent with the structure of models employed. This paper re‐visits the debate, first to address critics' major concerns, and second because in the view of the present authors, the debate closed on an unduly pessimistic note. This paper develops a simultaneous, rational expectations model of the USD/GBP market, with functional relationships for hedgers, speculators and a spot rate equation. The model is estimated with data contemporaneous to the debate, including a period during which the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission did not collect data on traders' open positions. Using the results of post‐debate research on tests for stationarity with missing observations, the model, using only public information, outperforms a random walk in post‐sample forecasts of the spot rate. Recent microstructure models of the exchange rate based on order flow have re‐kindled the forecasting debate. The model developed here, however, is differentiated from these microstructure models, first because order flow utilises both public and private information, and second because the microstructure models do not directly address critics' concerns.