Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

Do rating agencies’ decisions impact stock risks? Evidence from European markets

This article analyses the effect of rating agencies’ decisions on stock risks for European issuers concerning five kinds of events. Our approach is an extension of dummy variable regression event study methodology, using a GARCH(1,1) estimation to capture simultaneously the impact on both systematic and specific stock risks. This new methodology allows us to obtain both global results by categories of rating decisions and individual results, event by event. We document, globally, a positive impact of upgrading on systematic risk, a negative impact of rating confirmation on specific risk, and no significant impact in all other cases. Regarding event-by-event results, the proportion of rating actions exhibiting a significant effect on risk is almost always observed between 20% and 30%. The weak evidence of a global effect on systematic risk may be due to the lack of informational content of the rating decisions on the stocks’ risk, or the existence of rebalancing effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the decline in volatility in case of a rating affirmed is an insight of the certification role played by the agencies.     

Performance of Moving Average Trading Rules in a Volatile Stock Market: The Russian Evidence

This article examines the profitability of dual moving average crossover (DMAC) trading strategies in the Russian stock market over the 2003–12 period. It contributes to the existing technical analysis (TA) literature by testing, for the first time, the applicability of ordered weighted moving averages (OWMA) as an alternative calculation basis for determining DMACs. In addition, this article provides the first comprehensive performance comparison of DMAC trading rules in the stock market that is known as one of the most volatile markets in the world. The results show that the best trading strategies of the in-sample period can also outperform their benchmark portfolio during the subsequent out-of-sample period. Moreover, the outperformance of the best DMAC strategies is mostly attributable to their superior performance during bearish periods and, particularly, during stock market crashes.     

Wichtige betriebswirtschaftliche Fachkonferenzen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

ECONOMIC GROWTH, INCOME AND HAPPINESS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

The pursuit of high economic growth is considered desirable as it generates an increase in a nation's wealth, income, employment and output. The rising income should enable consumers to purchase more goods and services, which in turn should result in enhanced utility and subjective happiness. Empirical studies suggest that higher income resulting from high rates of economic growth contribute to poverty alleviation and life satisfaction in low income countries. Higher income raises the happiness of the poor. In developed countries, higher income does not seem to "buy" higher happiness, once a threshold level of income is reached. This exploratory study seeks to examine the quantitative and qualitative sources of happiness. A higher absolute level of income is found to be significantly related to subjective happiness. Among the non-income factors, family togetherness, a good working environment and a higher level of education can contribute to making people happier. Happiness thus involves more than just economic growth and income.     

An algorithm for resource allocation with constraints in an input-output framework

In a large corporation or at the national level, planning involves a large number of inter-related activities competing for the same resources. In spite of its rather restrictive assumptions, Leontief's Input-Output model is still one of the best tool for the study of physical and financial flows between activities or economic sectors. A simple algorithm to find its solution when the available resources are limited is presented in this paper. The properties of that algorithm that was incorporated in an inter-industrial model built in Venezuela are proven and are followed by examples of application.

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Riassunto In grandi imprese o in sistemi economici nazionali la pianificazione riguarda un numero elevato di attività interrelate che fanno uso delle stesse risorse. Nonostante le ipotesi di base piuttosto restrittive, il modelloinput-output di Leontief è ancora uno degli strumenti più efficaci per lo studio dei flussi fisici e finanziari tra attività o settori economici.In questo lavoro viene presentato un semplice algoritmo per individuare la soluzione d'un problema di pianificazione quando sono limitati gli ammontari delle risorse. Sono dimonstrate alcune proprietà di questo algoritmo, che fu impiegato su un modello di relazioni interindustriali costruito in Venezuela e sono fornite alcune applicazioni esemplificatrici.

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Versione definitiva pervenuta il 14-2-1983     

Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?*

The regulation of fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termination charges has become increasingly important in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand under the Calling Party Pays principle. In the absence of any regulation, mobile operators have an incentive to set F2M termination charges “too high”. We show that the setting of the optimal F2M termination charges depends on the significance of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. We also discuss the merits of possible remedies which are not very intrusive. Tommaso Valletti has advised the European Commission and the UK regulator (OFCOM) on mobile termination and Frontier Economics has acted as advisor to a number of mobile operators on the same issue. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone. We thank Carlo Cambini, Yulia Kossykh, participants to the 15th Biennial International Telecommunications Society Conference, the 3rd International Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research in Berlin, for their comments. We also thank the editor Michael Crew and two anonymous referees for many suggestions that have greatly improved the paper.