Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany

Abstract. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict free‐riding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free‐rider problem.     

Boasting and aspiring,as status‐reinforcing mechanisms in status‐based loyalty programs

In the retail industry, status‐based loyalty programs (SBLP) are commonly used as an important marketing tool to award elevated status to customers who exceed certain level of spending. In contrast to previous studies that have considered “target and bystander” and “member–non‐member” differentiation, this study responds to the need to account for the dynamics in across‐tier effects in loyalty programs (LPs). By undertaking a scenario‐based experiment that focuses on a “face‐to‐face” across‐tier social event, this study examines the joint effects of exclusivity, status visibility and social comparison on LP members’ status perception and willingness to spend. Contrary to prior beliefs that the beneficial effects for targets (e.g., VIP members) in status hierarchies are offset by the negative effects on bystanders (e.g., non‐VIP members), this study concludes that situations when social comparisons occur in SBLPs are not necessarily zero‐sum games. Ultimately, this study uncovered two distinct status‐reinforcing mechanisms–“aspiring” and “boasting”–which LP members may experience in SBLPs. The outcome of this study highlights important implications for companies to pursue different strategies aimed at enhancing members’ status perceptions.     

The effects of income taxation on severance pay

Severance pay often results from a bargain between the firm and the employee to avoid or terminate a legal conflict. We theoretically investigate how income taxation affects these negotiations. Using panel data from West Germany and exploiting a change in tax law in 1999, we find that a higher income tax on severance pay reduces the probability of obtaining it and – in some specifications – also lowers its amount. Our results imply overshifting of the increase in the tax burden.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

Risk Aversion and Trade‐Union Membership*

If trade unions provide only their members with insurance against income variations, as a private good, this insurance will provide a stronger incentive for more risk‐averse employees to become union members. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and various direct measures of individual risk attitudes, we find robust evidence of a positive relationship between risk aversion and the likelihood of union membership for full‐time employees. This association is particularly strong for males and in West Germany.     

Habit formation and wage determination

We analyse the implications of habit formation relating to wages in a multiperiod efficiency‐wage model. If employees have such preferences, their existence provides firms with incentives to raise wages and reduce employment over time. Greater intensity does not necessarily have the same consequences, because wage adjustments counteract the initial level impact. The firm's response additionally depends on the wage dependency of dismissal costs, because such costs make an increasing wage profile over time more attractive and mitigate the effects of greater intensity of habit formation. We further show that short‐lived productivity shocks have long‐lasting wage and employment consequences. Moreover, habit concerns by firm owners reduce wages.     

The Evolution and Restructuring of Diversified Business Groups in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from Chaebols in Korea

This paper proposes an evolutionary model of business groups in emerging economies by tracing the evolution and restructuring of business groups in Korea. Underlying our model are two theoretical premises: (1) the value-creation potential of business group diversification depends on the quality of the economic institutions supporting the economy; and (2) the strategy-structure fit is a key determinant of diversified business groups' performance. Combining these two premises, we link business group evolution with institutional context, sources of competitive advantages, diversification strategy, and structure. To illustrate our theoretical arguments, we provide an overview of the evolution of chaebols in Korea and examine the restructuring of two major business groups, LG and Hyundai Motor. We conclude by discussing implications for management, public policy, and future research.