Decomposing Redistributive Effects of Taxes and Transfers in Australia: Annual and Lifetime Measures

This paper decomposes the redistributive effect on annual and lifetime inquality of a range of taxes and transfers in Australia, using a dynamic cohort lifetime simulation model. The redistributive effect is decomposed into vertical, horizontal and reranking effects. Horizontal inequities in the tax and transfer system are found to be negligible. The extent of reranking is greater in the lifetime than in the annual context and is affected by the equivalence scales used to adjust household incomes. If no adjustment is made to household incomes, reranking is about nine per cent of the reduction in lifetime inequality. However, if each child is counted as equivalent to one-third of an adult, reranking is found to be less than one per cent.     

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.     

Does One Size Fit All? A currency union with asymmetric transmissions and a stability pact

The theory of optimal currency areas stresses that a single currency zone should have symmetry across shocks and structures. What happens if the monetary transmission mechanisms differ so that a common monetary policy has different effects in different places? Using a fully specified econometric model, we find that such asymmetries are likely to destabilise the business cycle and put countries out of phase with each other in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit-constrained national fiscal policies. Market discipline, however, could achieve this. Hence, the question is whether the markets would create sufficient discipline on their own.     

Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands : An empirical investigation using the co-integration approach

The ‘wage space’, which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth, has played a major role as an indicator of allowable wage increases in the post-war wage negotiations in the Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wages and the wage space are co-integrated; (b) the deviation between wages and the wage space may act as an error correction term in the wage equation when both variables are identified as I(2); and (c) political consensus and the threat of labour conflicts (rather than actual strike activity) may be identified as the ‘mechanism’ behind this error correction in the wage equation.     

Seasonality and Markov switching in an unobserved component time series model

It is generally acknowledged that the growth rate of output, the seasonal pattern, and the business cycle are best estimated simultaneously. To achieve this, we develop an unobserved component time series model for seasonally unadjusted US GDP. Our model incorporates a Markov switching regime to produce periods of expansion and recession, both of which are characterized by different underlying growth rates. Although both growth rates are time-varying, they are assumed to be cointegrated. The analysis is Bayesian, which fully accounts for all sources of uncertainty. Comparison with results from a similar model for seasonally adjusted data indicates that the seasonal adjustment of the data significantly alters several aspects of the full model. First Version Received: January 2001/Final Version Received: February 2002 Send offprint requests to: Rob Luginbuhl?Correspondence to: Rob Luginbuhl     

Environmental liability and the capital structure of firms

This paper analyses the impact of environmental liability regimes on the capital structure of firms. We show that imposing environmental liability only on polluting firms, with limited liability, increases use of bank debt. Extending environmental liability to banks lowers bank borrowing relative to liability only on firms, with an ambiguous effect relative to no liability. Using US industry-level data we estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by firms and show that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms increased bank borrowing by 15–20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowing returned to a level slightly higher than with no liability.     

Un modello matriciale per la dominanza stocastica e stocastico-temporale

In questa nota si estendono alcuni precedenti risultati dovuti a Beccacece-Castagnoli [1]–[2] e Levi [7], sulla dominanza temporale, stocastica e stocastico-temporale tra flussi finanziari, certi o aleatori, nel caso discreto e finito. Largo spazio viene anche dato ad esempi critici e controesempi.

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Summary This paper extends previous results by Beccacece-Castagnoli [1]–[2] and Levi [7] on time dominance, stochastic dominance, time-stochastic dominance for discrete, finite, deterministic or stochastic, cashflows. Last sections are devoted to critical examples and counterexamples.

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Ricerca parzialmente finanziata dal M.U.R.S.T. e dall'Università Bocconi.     

The living company

What can explain the longevity gap between a company that survives for centuries--the Swedish company Stora, for example, which is more than 700 years old--and the average corporation, which does not last 20 years? A team at Royal Dutch/Shell Group explored that question. Arie de Geus, a retired Shell executive, writes about the team's findings and describes what he calls living companies-organizations that have beaten the high mortality rate of the average corporation. Many companies die young, de Geus argues, because their policies and practices are based too heavily on the thinking and language of economics. Their managers focus on producing goods and services and forget that the organization is a community of human beings that is in business--any business--to stay alive. In contrast, managers of living companies consider themselves to be stewards of a long-standing enterprise. Their priorities reflect their commitment to the organization's long-term survival in an unpredictable world. Like careful gardeners, they encourage growth and renewal without endangering the plant they are tending. They value profits the same way most people value oxygen: as necessary for life but not the purpose of it. They scuttle assets when necessary to make a dramatic change in the business portfolio. And they constantly search for new ideas. These managers also focus on developing people. They create opportunities for employees to learn from one another. Such organizations are suited for survival in a world in which success depends on the ability to learn, to adapt, and to evolve.