Differentiation Among US Colleges and Universities

Colleges and universities in the US differ markedly in their access to economic resources. National data are used here to describe the resulting hierarchy that's reflected in schools' spending on their students, the prices those students pay, and the subsidies they get in consequence. Both historical data and projections based on recent institutional saving suggest that economic disparities among institutions and their students are increasing. In a final section, the paper asks what to make of this: what we can say about the right degree of institutional disparity – whether we have too much, too little, or about the right amount of differentiation.     

Sales compensation governance: the last frontier of corporate reform

The area of sales compensation has remained relatively untouched by recent pressures for compensation reform. This article highlights some of the ways that sales organizations stumble in managing their compensation programs, and why it takes more than a simple tactical fix to address these problems effectively. The authors describe a more structured governance framework that not only identifies and resolves key sales compensation issues, but ultimately safeguards the effectiveness and financial integrity of the sales organization itself.     

Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology

The traditional view of appointments to executive agencies isthat the president has virtual carte blanche in the selectionof personnel for his "team." Yet many formal models of appointmentsuggest that presidents must accommodate the policy preferencesof senators when making nominations. Several empirical studieshave confirmed that legislative preferences are a significantdeterminant of the ideology of appointees, but these studieshave focused on appointments to the federal judiciary; the researchhas not addressed appointments to executive agencies. Appointmentsto executive agencies from 1936 to 1996 are examined, by employinga special sample of appointees to those positions—thosewho have served in Congress at some point in their careers.For these "bridging" individuals, it is possible to analyzestrictly comparable measures of ideology for the appointees,their nominating presidents, and the senators who voted to confirmthem. A linear regression analysis provides significant supportfor the hypothesis that appointee ideology is affected by variationin the ideological tilt in Congress.     

Does the recent success of some OECD countries in lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labor market reforms?

In recent years some OECD countries were successful in loweringthe unemployment rate substantially while other countries werenot. In this paper we investigate to what extent successfulcountries implemented a comprehensive set of institutional reforms.We present a theoretical framework to investigate the relationshipbetween unemployment and labor market institutions (LMI) suchas labor taxes, unemployment benefits, employment protection,union bargaining power and (de)centralization of bargaining.In our empirical analysis of data over the period 1960–99of 17 OECD countries we show that particular combinations ofLMI are responsible for low unemployment rates.