On the different “worlds” of intra-organizational knowledge management: Understanding idiosyncratic variation in MNC cross-site knowledge-sharing practices

This qualitative field study investigated cross-site knowledge sharing in a small sample of multinational corporations in three different MNC business contexts (global, multidomestic, transnational). The results disclose heterogeneous “worlds” of MNC knowledge sharing, ultimately raising the question as to whether the whole concept of MNC knowledge sharing covers a sufficiently unitary phenomenon to be meaningful. We derive a non-exhaustive typology of MNC knowledge-sharing practices: self-organizing knowledge sharing, technocratic knowledge sharing, and best practice knowledge sharing. Despite its limitations, this typology helps to elucidate a number of issues, including the latent conflict between two disparate theories of MNC knowledge sharing, namely “sender–receiver” and “social learning” theories (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009). More generally, we develop the term “knowledge contextualization” to highlight the way that firm-specific organizational features pre-define which knowledge is considered to be of special relevance for intra-organizational sharing.     

The pricing of FIREARMs (“Falling Interest Rate Adjustable-Rate Mortgages”)

The purpose of this article is to propose and price a new type of adjustable-rate mortgage: the FIREARM (Falling Interest Rate Adjustable-Rate Mortgage). The interest payments on this mortgage adjust downward whenever interest rates decline, while remaining stable when interest rates increase. The FIREARM is alternatively priced as a prepayable and non-prepayable mortgage with a spread over the short-term interest rate. We price these two instruments and contrast their prices with those of fixed-rate mortgages using the parsimonious assumptions of a non-stationary arbitrage-free binomial term structure model.     

EEO program deals management a good hand

The U.S. General Accounting Office's EEO program provided managers with more than just legal information. Instead of focusing on how to avoid legal problems, the program gave managers tools and skills they could use to cultivate diversity and improve productivity.     

The Impact of Large Changes in Asset Prices on Intra-Market Correlations in the Domestic and International Markets

We consider the impact of "large" changes in asset prices on intra-market correlations in domestic and international markets. Assuming normally distributed asset returns, we show that the absolute magnitude of the correlation, conditional on a change is greater than or equal to a given absolute size of one of the variables, is monotonically increasing in the magnitude of that absolute change. Empirical tests using domestic and international-market data support this theoretical result. These results have significant implications for portfolio management, hedging interest rate risk, tests of asset pricing models, Roll's concern with asset pricing models' explanatory power, and implementation of Value-at-Risk.     

The bias in Black-Scholes/Black implied volatility: An analysis of equity and energy markets

In this paper we examine the extent of the bias between Black and Scholes (1973)/Black (1976) implied volatility and realized term volatility in the equity and energy markets. Explicitly modeling a market price of volatility risk, we extend previous work by demonstrating that Black-Scholes is an upward-biased predictor of future realized volatility in S&P 500/S&P 100 stock-market indices. Turning to the Black options-on-futures formula, we apply our methodology to options on energy contracts, a market in which crises are characterized by a positive correlation between price-returns and volatilities: After controlling for both term-structure and seasonality effects, our theoretical and empirical findings suggest a similar upward bias in the volatility implied in energy options contracts. We show the bias in both Black-Scholes/Black implied volatilities to be related to a negative market price of volatility risk. JEL Classification G12 · G13     

The economic impact of subsidized industrial R&D in Israel

Israel offers contingent subsidies to selected industrial R&D projects, with the purpose of creating high–quality jobs, reducing the trade deficit, increasing productivity and promoting growth. In 1987–94, 1,200 firms received $1,400 million of subsidies in support of $3,500 million of R&D (in constant 1996 dollars). We estimate that this R&D generated more than $31,000 million of sales, increasing industrial employment by about 10% and contributing to the trade balance a sum slightly less than the entire private sector deficit in the current account. It added 0.3% to GDP in increased productivity, each dollar of supported R&D adding an additional $0.45 to GDP and earning the economy a direct annual return of 13.4%. Electronics, broadly defined, received roughly half the subsidies while accounting for nearly two thirds of the gains; small firms that received one sixth of the subsidies contributed over a quarter of the gains.     

Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting arrow social welfare functions

An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are n dimensional vectors with the ith component of such a vector being the part of the alternative effecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish (i is indifferent between any two alternatives that have the same ith component) we characterize all the families of permissible individual preferences that admit nondictatorial Arrow-type social welfare functions. We also show that the existence of such a function for a given family of preferences is independent of n provided that is greater than one.     

The value of a stochastic information structure

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information structures that measure their value.