Economic efficiency and downside risk

This article investigates the impact of downside risk on cost and revenue efficiency (RE) for a sample of farms. Downside risk or loss below a certain level of return is a concern regardless of producer risk preferences and thus a suitable measure of risk to use. Downside risk was measured as the weighted summation of net farm income below the amount needed for unpaid labour during the previous 10 years. Cost and RE were estimated using traditional input and output measures, and then re-estimated including each farm’s downside risk. Comparisons were made between the efficient farms with and without downside risk and the average for all farms. As expected, downside risk plays an important role in explaining farm inefficiency. Failure to account for downside risk overstates inefficiency and can lead to unrealistic expectations in potential efficiency improvements.     

Monetary aspects of Walras's law and the stock-flow problem

Walras's Law is a tautology. It illuminates interrelations among supplies and demands for goods, services, securities, and money and among their supply/demand imbalances. The Law emphasizes that no one thing or group of things can be in excess supply or excess demand by itself. It thereby helps focus attention on the role in macroeconomic disorder, especially in depression, of a distinctively functioning object of market exchange—money. Yet complications arise, and Walras's Law has itself sometimes been called into question. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the very concepts that enter into the Law and into supposed difficulties. Distinctions between "notional" and "effective" supplies and demands and between stock and flow conceptions of quantities and imbalances require attention.     

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure

The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.     

Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.