Mixed Equilibrium,Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: An Experimental Study

We experimentally study three aspects of $2\times 2$ one-shot games with collaboratively dominant strategies: if subjects play according to the mixed Nash equilibrium; if the collaborative equilibrium has a focal point property; and if the burning money mechanism stimulates a collaborative behavior. First, our results show that players do not seem to play according to the mixed Nash equilibrium and that the collaborative equilibrium does not seem to have focal point properties. In fact, the subjects seem to prefer less risky strategies when compared to efficient ones. Our results also show that a burning money mechanism only helps players to collaborate when it transforms a collaborative profile of strategies into a collaborative equilibrium. This fact is justified because other burning money mechanisms will only help collaboration if the subjects were playing according to de mixed Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, even when burning money mechanisms improved the collaboration rate, such rate’s increase was smaller than the expected by the mixed Nash equilibrium.     

Worldwide willingness to delegate and country labor quality

The purpose of this article is to examine how country workforce characteristics shape the willingness of managers to delegate authority to subordinates. Using data from worldwide surveys, we tested to what extent country-specific factors, such as workforce competence, motivation, and probity, shape the willingness of managers to grant decisional power to subordinates. The results show that the willingness to delegate across the 47 countries might be explained by a combined effect of workforce competence, motivation, and probity, labeled quality of country labor. It is argued that in countries where managers perceive that the labor quality is lower (lack of competence, motivation, and probity), the managerial willingness to hand over power to subordinates decreases. The findings of this study have both theoretical and practical implications for the managerial practice of firms doing business internationally. These findings will assist companies and managers to better understand why delegation might not work as expected in one country, whereas the same practice is both effective and indicated in other countries.     

Psychic Distance versus Market Size in International Business: Study of Brazilian Exporters

International Business (IB) theories encompass economic approaches, where firms use objective criteria to select foreign markets, and behavioral approaches, where firms use psychic distance. This study proposes new objective criteria to measure psychic distance and adopts multiple linear regressions with a foreign-trade econometric model adapted to address psychic distance and market size and their relationships with Brazilian exports over 10 years. Psychic distance showed a close relationship to exports from smaller firms, while the market size of the destination country was always significant. This brought original empirical evidence to the validity of IB theories as well as to the exports behavior of firms from emerging economies.     

Does bank capital affect lending behavior?

This paper investigates the existence of cross-sectional differences in the response of lending to monetary policy and GDP shocks owing to differences in bank capitalization. It adds to the literature by using the excess capital-to-asset ratio, which can better control the riskiness of banks' portfolios, and by disentangling the effects of the “bank lending channel” from those of the “bank capital channel.” The results, based on a sample of Italian banks, indicate that bank capital matters in the propagation of different types of shocks to lending, owing to the existence of regulatory capital constraints and imperfections in the market for bank fund-raising.     

THE UNEQUALIZING EFFECTS OF ICT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

We analyse the effects of information and communication technology (ICT) on levels and growth of per capita GDP in two different ways: (1) by treating ICT as a specific type of physical capital and as a variable that helps to correct for quality existing physical capital measures, and (2) by considering that telephone lines, personal computers and internet hosts are ‘bottleneck‐reducing’ factors that increase the productivity of labour by making easier the diffusion and processing of (non‐rivalrous and almost non‐excludable) knowledge. We compare the relative significance of the two hypotheses in level and growth estimates and find that, when separately taken, both of them improve upon the classical Mankiw et al. (Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107 (1992), pp. 407–437)/Islam (Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 (1995), pp. 1127–1169) framework. These findings show that our approach captures dimensions of time‐varying country‐specific technological progress that previous approaches in the literature did not take into account.     

Relationship and Transaction Lending: New Evidence and Perspectives

In this article, I try to answer three questions: (1) How do relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the cycle? (2) How do economic systems that are more “bank oriented” perform compared to “market-oriented” systems? (3) What are the consequences on relationship banking of the recent structural bank regulation reforms adopted to separate specific investment and commercial banking activities? Building on some recent evidence, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) Relationship banks protect their clients in normal downturns; (2) when recessions coincide with a financial crisis, countries that rely relatively more on bank financing tend to be more severely hit; (3) the effects of structural bank regulation initiatives on relationship banking are uncertain.     

Monopoly regulation under asymmetric information: prices versus quantities

We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance. With unknown demand and increasing marginal costs, the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity, whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease. The simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease, but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase. With unknown costs, both instruments are equivalent.     

Debt Sustainability and the Ongoing Financial Crisis: The Case of IDA‐only African Countries*

Abstract: The ongoing financial crisis has raised concerns in many circles about a potential future wave of sovereign defaults spreading among developing countries and, therefore, the need for additional rounds of debt relief in poor indebted countries. This paper addresses this issue for a group of 31 International Development Association (IDA)‐only African countries, which are in a fragile debt situation. Using the most recent debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) undertaken for these countries by the World Bank and the IMF, this paper studies the potential adverse effect of the ongoing financial crisis on the countries’ debt burden indicators, as a function of the depth and length of the crisis. The latter is measured by the fall and the duration of such fall in exports revenues, and by the terms at which each country can obtain financing to muddle through the crisis period. The analysis underscores the importance of concessional financing for these countries, especially if the crisis proves to be a protracted one. This, because the likelihood of countries being able to muddle through the crisis without defaulting on their external debt decreases with the hardening of the financial conditions faced by them — alternatively, the size of the downsizing in domestic (fiscal) expenditures needed to ensure the service of their foreign debts increases with the tightening of financial conditions.     

MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT UNDER AN EXTERNAL AND FISCAL CONSTRAINT: A FIX‐PRICE/FLEX‐PRICE APPROACH

This paper presents a dual economy model of the fix‐price/flex‐price kind that explicitly allows for the existence of a government budget constraint in a fully open economy. Both the external and fiscal closures resemble very much the contemporary experience of several Latin American countries, where fiscal discipline and fix exchange rate systems have been the norm. Thus, within the public sector, it is assumed that public investment is the adjustment variable, while foreign reserves variation adjusts the external balance. Short‐run impacts of policy‐induced variables and changes in exogenous external financing are analysed. Relevant trade‐offs, especially between output and inflation, follow from an analysis in which the time perspective is rather short. However, in the medium term, some balancing forces in the economy can moderate the trade‐offs. We show among a wide range of events and policy options that this is the case of debt relief or a concerted lending strategy.     

On input market surplus and its relation to the downstream market game

Abstract In order to analyze the welfare effects of price changes in input markets – following for example a price‐fixing conspiracy – economists have studied the relationship between the surplus measured in the input markets and the surplus in the output markets. The latest results hinge on simplifying assumptions, which are relaxed here by linking the input markets surplus question to another stream of literature, which characterizes functions that oligopolists collectively, yet unintentionally, maximize. It is shown that the area under the input demands is equal to the change in a function for which critical points coincide with the equilibria of the downstream game. A particular case of these functions is the exact potential function.