The economics of urban yard space: An “implicit-market” model for housing attributes

A theoretical housing model is developed embodying the approach of the recent hedonic price literature. Instead of focusing on a scalar “housing service” consumption measure, the model portrays housing as a commodity with two attributes: floor space and yard space. Developers react to a consumer bid-rent function, which relates dwelling rent to floor space, yard space, and location, in choosing the profit-maximizing characteristics of their housing complexes. The spatial behavior of the developer's choice variables is investigated (an interesting question is whether yards are larger farther from the urban center), and a comparative static analysis of the housing market equilibrium is presented.     

MSE-improvement of the least squares estimator by dropping variables

It is well known that dropping variables in regression analysis decreases the variance of the least squares (LS) estimator of the remaining parameters. However, after elimination estimates of these parameters are biased, if the full model is correct. In his recent paper, Boscher (1991) showed that the LS-estimator in the special case of a mean shift model (cf. Cook and Weisberg, 1982) which assumes no “outliers” can be considered in the framework of a linear regression model where some variables are deleted. He derived conditions under which this estimator outperforms the LS-estimator of the full model in terms of the mean squared error (MSE)-matrix criterion. We demonstrate that this approach can be extended to the general set-up of dropping variables. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the MSE-matrix superiority of the LS-estimator in the reduced model over that in the full model are derived. We also provide a uniformly most powerful F-statistic for testing the MSE-improvement.     

Profit,productivity, and profit-sharing

This study is an investigation of the effect of profit-sharing on labor productivity. When monitoring labor performance is costly for management, a regular wage/salary contract is insufficient to induce profit-maximizing behavior from the worker. The authors demonstrate that when this profit-maximizing behavior can be induced only through profit-sharing, a linear profit-sharing program will increase productivity and the welfare of both management and labor. The benefit from profit-sharing is increasing up to the point where the utility of additional income is offset by the negative utility of extraordinary effort (working harder or providing higher quality work). The income effect, i.e., the change in negative utility of extraordinary effort given a change in income, can potentially either increase or decrease the point at which the income-effort tradeoff-reaches zero.     

Optimal fiscal zoning when the local government is a discriminating monopolist

Monopoly zoning by local governments has been studied extensively since the original article by White [1975, in: E. Mills and W. Oates, eds., Fiscal zoning and land use controls (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA)]. However, little or no attention has been paid to the possibility of monopolistic discrimination under such a regime. The question is: When will zoning multiple lot sizes be feasible given that buyers with different valuations of land cannot be coerced into purchasing particular lots? The literature on imperfect price discrimination by monopolists is brought to bear on this question. It is shown that the resulting zoning strategy may or may not involve multiple lot sizes. The factors determining the optimal strategy are studied in detail, with particular emphasis on the nature of the market for undeveloped land in the community.