排序方式: 共有67条查询结果,搜索用时 46 毫秒
41.
文章从理论和实践两个方面证明和阐述了资源循环利用是矿区发展循环经济的有效途径,进而从矿区生态背景调查与分析入手,提出纵向主导产业链设计和横向耦合共生产业链构建的方法,最终形成矿区资源循环利用产业网状体系,从而达到既提高经济效益又从根本上改善生态环境的"双赢"目的。 相似文献
42.
John A. List 《Southern economic journal》2015,81(3):538-561
Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multidimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal‐agent model prediction. This article reconciles the literature using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principal's monitoring ability and the principal's choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring. 相似文献
43.
Richard Engelbrecht‐Wiggans John A. List David H. Reiley 《International Economic Review》2006,47(1):203-231
Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform‐price auctions. The present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders. Our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should decrease with an increase in the number of bidders. Considerable demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit, although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play. We experimentally confirm several of our predictions by examining bidding behavior of subjects in an actual marketplace, auctioning dozens of sportscards using both uniform‐price and Vickrey auction formats. 相似文献
44.
Using Ex Ante Approaches to Obtain Credible Signals for Value in Contingent Markets: Evidence from the Field 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
While contingent valuation remains the only option available for measurement of total economic value of nonmarketed goods, the method has been criticized due to its hypothetical nature. We analyze field experimental data to evaluate two ex ante approaches to attenuating hypothetical bias, directly comparing value statements across four distinct referenda: hypothetical, "cheap talk,""consequential," and real. Our empirical evidence suggests two major findings: hypothetical responses are significantly different from real responses; and responses in the consequential and cheap talk treatments are statistically indistinguishable from real responses. We review the potential for each method to produce reliable results in the field. 相似文献
45.
John A. List 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(3):203-212
This special issue highlights an empirical approach that has increasingly grown in prominence in the last decade—field experiments.
While field experiments can be used quite generally in economics—to test theories’ predictions, to measure key parameters,
and to provide insights into the generalizability of empirical results—this special issue focuses on using field experiments
to explore questions within the economics of charity. The issue contains six distinct field experimental studies that investigate
various aspects associated with the economics of charitable giving. The issue also includes a fitting tribute to one of the
earliest experimenters to depart from traditional lab methods, Peter Bohm, who curiously has not received deep credit or broad
acclaim. Hopefully this issue will begin to rectify this oversight.
相似文献
46.
Devolution of tasks to local levels of government has recently become a popular agenda item within certain political factions in the US. While one expects the local policymaker to tailor policies to match the preferences of his constituents, critics of local policymaking claim that externalities are ignored and inefficiencies thus arise under local control of certain policies. A primary example concerns the control of pollution, which is known to have adverse effects on neighbouring jurisdictions. Whether localities actually ‘race to the bottom’ and enact lax environmental policies when given the chance remains an open issue. In this study, we make use of stochastic dominance tests to examine if President Reagan's policy of ‘New Federalism’ in the early 1980s induced states to lower environmental standards. Among the several environmental measures analysed, we do not find any evidence that the ‘race to the bottom’ materialized. Indeed, the evidence shows that even during these lean years of federal intervention several indicators of environmental quality at the state level continued to improve. 相似文献
47.
Abstract. We can think of no question more fundamental to experimental economics than understanding whether, and under what circumstances, laboratory results generalize to naturally occurring environments. In this paper, we extend Levitt and List (2006) to the class of games in which financial payoffs and 'doing the right thing' are not necessarily in conflict. We argue that behaviour is crucially linked to not only the preferences of people, but also the properties of the situation. By doing so, we are able to provide a road map of the psychological and economic properties of people and situations that might interfere with generalizability of laboratory result from a broad class of games. 相似文献
48.
Volatility timing in mutual funds: evidence from daily returns 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
I use daily mutual fund returns to shed new light on the questionof whether or not mutual fund managers are successful markettimers. Previous studies find that funds are unable to timethe market return. I study the funds' ability to time marketvolatility. I show that volatility timing is an important factorin the returns of mutual funds and has led to higher risk-adjustedreturns. The returns of surviving funds are especially sensitiveto market volatility; those of nonsurvivors are not. 相似文献
49.
Michael A. Spencer Stephen K. Swallow Jason F. Shogren John A. List 《Journal of public economics》2009,93(5-6):798-806
This paper considers how six alternative rebate rules affect voluntary contributions in a threshold public-good experiment. The rules differ by (1) whether an individual can receive a proportional rebate of excess contributions, a winner-takes-all of any excess contributions, or a full rebate of one's contribution in the event the public good is provided and excess contributions exist, and (2) whether the probability of receiving a rebate is proportional to an individual's contribution relative to total contributions or is a simple uniform probability distribution set by the number of contributors. The paper adds to the existing experimental economics literature on threshold public goods by investigating both aggregate and individual demand revelation under the winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules. Half of the rules (proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and random full-rebate with uniform probability) provide total contributions that nearly equal total benefits, while the rest (winner-take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only, and random full-rebate with proportional probability) exceed benefits by over 30%. Only the proportional rebate rule is found to achieve both aggregate and individual demand revelation. Our experimental results have implications for both fundraisers and valuation practitioners. 相似文献
50.
This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity. 相似文献