The role of the state in resolving business disputes in China

In this paper, we follow the theoretical framework proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) to investigate the role of the state in resolving business disputes and its impact on enterprise performance. Using a survey of private enterprises in China, we first construct an index to quantify the power of the state vis-à-vis the market in resolving business disputes, and then find that enterprises located in regions where the government has a greater relative power enjoy better performance. Our results suggest that the regulatory state has played a positive role in the economic transition in China.     

拓宽专业口径,优化课程体系,培养新世纪合格人才

在实施科教兴国战略的过程中 ,作为知识创新、传播与应用和培养创新精神和创新人才摇篮的高等学校 ,面对新世纪对人才的需求 ,拓宽专业口径 ,改革人才培养模式 ,探索宽口径专业下培养适应社会需求的高质量人才 ,全面推进素质教育 ,增强学生未来工作的适应性是摆在高等学校面前的重要课题     

优势使用何以促进员工创新？和谐式激情与平台型领导的作用

基于自我决定理论,采用三阶段追踪调查数据,构建并验证优势使用对员工创新行为的影响机制,考察和谐式激情的中介作用以及平台型领导的调节作用。通过对341份有效问卷的统计分析发现,和谐式激情在优势使用影响员工创新行为的过程中发挥部分中介作用;平台型领导不仅正向调节优势使用对员工和谐式激情的正向影响,而且正向调节优势使用通过和谐式激情影响员工创新行为的间接效应。     

Competitive experience and gender difference in risk preference,trust preference and academic performance: Evidence from Gaokao in China

This study examines whether and how competitive experience affects gender difference in the preferences for risk and trust as well as academic performance. By utilizing the provincial differences in college admission rates as an indicator of competitive experience for students, we assess its relationship with gender difference in risk preference, trust preference, and academic performance. We find that females from provinces with lower college admission rates are more risk averse and less trustful, and perform better in more competitive environment, compared with their male counterparts. Our study suggests that observed gender differences may partially reflect the effects of schooling environment rather than inherent gender traits.     

德国光伏电价的下降历程及其对中国光伏发电产业的启示

近年来,我国大力发展光伏发电,然而目前的财政补贴和单一电价的扶持方式不足以实现其大规模发展。光伏大国——德国在2000~2011年间通过一系列政策调控,实现了光伏快速发展,同时光伏电价逐渐由50 Euro cent/kWh下降到20 Euro cent/kWh,降幅达60%,逐步接近市电价格。文章深入解析德国光伏的发展历程,利用投资与回报的分析方法,研究了德国光伏政策对装机量和光伏电价竞争性的影响,结果发现德国以清晰、有针对性的产业政策为基础,分起步、发展及调整三个阶段调整光伏电价,促使其累计装机量增加了325倍,上升至24 820 MWp。另外,德国采用全国终端用电客户分摊绿色电力成本的方式代替财政补贴,使其发展更具可持续性。借鉴德国经验,中国应该按光伏现有规模完善其电价体系,刺激光伏发展,同时,通过明朗的扶持政策增强光伏投资信心,构建稳定的投资回报预期。     

生物技术产业集群的动力机制及其演进——基于国外典型集群的多案例研究

在产业集群理论的总体框架下,本文以国外五个典型集群为研究对象,归纳了生物技术产业集群演化的关键动力要素,即科学研究、风险投资、传统大企业介入、政府支持、中介机构、市场需求、创新文化、相关产业支撑、龙头企业以及"龙头企业-专家型公司-科研机构"之间的良性互动。在此基础上,研究了要素的演进和集群发展的内在规律。最后,结合我国的实际情况,基于政府的视角得出若干促进我国生物园区发展的启示。     

论集体土地所有权的性质、主体及其内容的实现

文章研究目的:从法学和经济学的视角对现行集体土地所有权的性质、主体及其内容的实现进行分析,为相关政策制订提供理论前提.研究方法:文献资料法和调研法.研究结论:集体土地所有权作为一种所有权,具有总有的性质,且兼具公益性和私益性.而集体所有权的主体在现行法律框架内是明确的.本文提出应当在完善财产代理制度、实现形式多样化以及平衡其与土地承包经营权关系等方面更大程度地实现集体土地所有权的经济价值.     

Why is free education so popular? A political economy explanation

This paper analyzes the political support for different funding regimes of education in a one‐person, one‐vote democracy. We focus the analysis on four systems that have had a preponderant presence in the political debate on education: a private system, a public system that delivers the same resources to each student (universal‐free education), a public system that intends to equalize results, and a public system that aims to maximize the output of the economy. We show that a system of universal free education is the Condorcet winner. The level of income inequality and the degree to which income distribution is skewed to the right are key factors behind this conclusion. We also show that the voting outcome of public versus private funding for education depends crucially on the type of public funding under consideration.     

计及外部性的储能系统价值测算及经济性评估

以应用在电力系统中的电储能系统为研究对象,以外部性理论为基础,构建了计及外部性的储能系统经济性测算模型,并以储能系统接入光伏电站为例,采用贴现现金流分析方法,预估储能投资成本和收益,分别从投资者角度和社会整体效益角度,来研究储能系统应用在可再生能源发电侧的经济性,并进行了盈亏平衡分析。通过盈亏平衡曲线分析了储能盈亏平衡情景,经济性分析结果显示储能系统的外部性收益占年收益比例较大。     

Does an economic incentive affect provider behavior? Evidence from a field experiment on different payment mechanisms

Aims: This study analyzed discrepancies in the quantity of medical services supplied by physicians under different payment systems for patients with different health statuses and illnesses by means of a field experiment.

Methods: Based on the laboratory experiment of Heike Hennig-Schmidt, we designed a field experiment to examine fee-for-service (FFS), capitation (CAP), and diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment systems. Medical students were replaced with 220 physicians as experimental subjects, which more closely reflected the clinical choices made by physicians in the real world. Under the three payment mechanisms, the quantity of medical services provided by physicians when they treated patients with different health statuses and illnesses were collected. Finally, relevant statistics were computed and analyzed.

Results: It was found that payment systems (sig. = 0.000) and patient health status (sig. = 0.000) had a stronger effect on physicians’ choices regarding quantity of medical services than illness types (sig. = 0.793). Additionally, under the FFS and CAP payment systems, physicians overserved patients in good and intermediate health while underserving patients in bad health. Under the DRG payment system, physicians overserved patients in good health and underserved patients in intermediate and bad health. Correspondingly, under FFS and CAP, the proportional loss of benefits was the highest for patients in bad health and the lowest for patients in good and intermediate health; while under DRGs, patients in good and intermediate health had the largest and smallest loss of benefits, respectively.

Limitations: In order to increase external effects of experiment results, we used the field experiment to replace laboratory experiment. However, the external effects still existed because of the blurring and abstraction of the parameters.

Conclusions: Medical treatment cost and price affected the quantity of medical services provided by physicians. Therefore, we proposed that a mix of payment systems could address the common interests of physicians and patients, as well as influence incentives from payment systems.