The size of banking crises in credible fixed exchange rate regimes

Since monetary policy is constrained in fixed exchange rate regimes, we should observe fewer banking crises due to moral hazard in countries with credible currency pegs. However, three countries with seemingly credible pegs in the nineteen-eighties and -nineties, namely China, Hong Kong and Argentina, still suffered crises in their domestic banking sectors. The present note illustrates that bank incentives to take on excess risk still exist in countries with currency peg credibility and that the size of that risk exposure (and thus the potential for crisis) may be positively related to the level of central bank foreign exchange reserves.     

The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance

This paper examines the corporate governance role of shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. We find that target firms tend to underperform and have generally poor governance structures, with little indication of systematic agenda-seeking by the proposal sponsors. Governance quality also affects the voting outcomes and the announcement period stock price effects, with the latter strongest for first-time submissions and during stock market peaks. Proposal implementation is largely a function of voting success but is affected by managerial entrenchment and rent-seeking. The results imply that shareholder proposals are a useful device of external control, countering arguments that they should be restricted rather than facilitated under the SEC's current regulatory agenda.     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.     

International portfolio diversification benefits: Cross-country evidence from a local perspective

We investigate how the benefits of international portfolio diversification differ across countries from the perspective of a local investor. We find that the benefits of investing abroad are largest for investors in developing countries, including when controlling for currency effects. Most of the benefits are obtained from investing outside the region of the home country. These global diversification benefits remain large when controlling for short-sales constraints in developing stock markets. The gains from international portfolio diversification appear to be largest for countries with high country risk. In addition to this cross-sectional evidence, we also provide evidence that diversification benefits vary over time as country risk changes. We find that diversification benefits have decreased for most countries in our sample over the past two decades.     

The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation

We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, there are in reality many cases in which remuneration contracts are de facto senior to debt claims in financially distressed firms and in workouts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a “contract substitution” effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’ claims and creditors’ claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. If managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms.     

Long waves,inventions, and innovations

It is argued that aggregate R and D and patenting activity, while generally less volatile than short term economic activity, is more closely related to the latter in the longer term. Second, ‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’ inventions exhibit a clustering behaviour, although there appears to be no clear-cut relationship with the overall level of economic activity. Third, we find no support for Mensch's argument that lead times between invention and innovation contracted in the 1930s. Fourth, we find some evidence for a bunching of innovations in the 1930s, but this does not appear due to depression-induced acceleration. Fifth, in the particular case of plastics, where the 1930s clustering is particularly clear, the forces at work were primarily related to ‘science push’ and the particular requirements of the German economy.     

Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange

This paper examines how corporate control is exerted in companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. There are several alternative corporate governance mechanisms which may play a role in disciplining poorly performing management: blockholders (holding companies, industrial companies, families and institutions), the market for partial control, debt policy, and board composition. Even if there is redundancy of substitute forms of discipline, some mechanisms may dominate. We find that top managerial turnover is strongly related to poor performance measured by stock returns, accounting earnings in relation to industry peers and dividend cuts and omissions. Tobit models reveal that there is little relation between ownership and managerial replacement, although industrial companies resort to disciplinary actions when performance is poor. When industrial companies increase their share stake or acquire a new stake in a poorly performing company, there is evidence of an increase in executive board turnover, which suggests a partial market for control. There is little relation between changes in ownership concentration held by institutions and holding companies, and disciplining. Still, high leverage and decreasing solvency and liquidity variables are also followed by increased disciplining, as are a high proportion of non-executive directors and the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman.     

如何为云计算奠定坚实的物理基础

随着企业对性能、成本和能源控制方面的要求越来越高,一种能够有效共享资源、应用程序、软件和信息的平台--云计算技术应运而生.为了在有线或无线基础设施上充分发挥分布式计算模式的优势,企业和云服务供应商都需要可靠和高性能的智能物理网络层,以便在所需环境中实现可管理性和可快速扩展性.为可靠的云服务铺设物理基础需要全而的基础设施解决方案,在整合高性能、智能铜缆和光纤结构布线组件的同时需要明钾地选择无线解决方案.