Infra-industry spillovers and R&D cooperation: Theory and evidence

We analyse both the theoretical and the empirical side of the issue of R&D spillovers. Each firm's R&D costs are increasing in the amount of information transmitted to other firms, and we account for the possibility that firms control spillovers. We consider both Cournot-Nash and Cournot-Stackelberg behavior. The empirical analysis suggests that (i) firms' control on spillovers is relatively low; (ii) the cost-saving effect associated to joint ventures or R&D cartels is confirmed for industries where firms rely mainly upon own R&D as a source of innovation; (iii) R&D cooperation may increase information sharing, thereby enhancing spillovers.     

Product and destination mix in export markets

This article studies the joint destination and product strategies of exporters, using the universe of export transactions for firms located in Portugal in the period 1995–2005. The article breaks down the annual growth rate of total exports along different margins and details choices made by multi-product, multi-destination firms regarding their export portfolio. In addition, the article looks at similar features for the subsample of new exporters. We find that both the firm-level extensive and intensive margins are important in driving the year-to-year variation in aggregate exports. However, variation over time in the sales of continuing exporters is mainly driven by their sales in continuing destinations. In addition, a product’s export tenure within a firm varies largely across currently exported products in the context of an intense activity of product and destination switching. Moreover, the higher the importance of a product, the more its sales are concentrated in the firm’s top destination. Finally, the article finds that, while continuing exporters enter new markets mainly by selling old products, new exporters access new destinations mainly by exporting new products.     

Asymmetric cross-price effects and collusion

Asymmetries in cross-price elasticities have been demonstrated by several empirical studies, but received little attention by the theoretical literature. In this paper we study from a theoretical stance how introducing asymmetry in the substitution effects influences the sustainability of collusion. We first characterize the equilibrium of a linear Cournot duopoly with substitute goods, and consider substitution effects which are asymmetric in magnitude. Since the two goods are asymmetric strategic substitutes, the production decisions are driven by the firm which is relatively less influenced by the rival. We then study partial collusion using the folk theorem's solution concept. Our main result shows that the interval of quantities supporting collusion in the asymmetric setting is always smaller than the interval in the symmetric benchmark. The asymmetry in the substitution effects thus hinders collusion.     

MUTUAL AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF ITALIAN CO‐OPERATIVE BANKS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this study we analyze the concept of efficiency in co‐operative banks (CBs) from the points of view of the mutuality and sustainability of business. According to the extant literature, CBs are often less efficient than traditional banks, but the reason for this apparently higher inefficiency is strictly correlated to their statutory commitments. The purpose of this paper is to verify, through an empirical survey of 33 Tuscan ‘Banche di Credito Cooperativo’ (BCC), if a particular type of Italian CB is less or more competitive compared to non‐co‐operative ones by using and adapting two financial indicators: the financial value added and the cost‐income ratio. Our findings show that by implementing appropriate corrections to the value‐added indicator and to the cost‐income ratio, BCC appear efficient and mission‐oriented, with a significantly reduced performance gap in comparison to non‐co‐operative credit institutions.     

A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games

We analyze dynastic repeated games. These are repeated games in which the stage game is played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. Each individual has preferences that replicate those of the infinitely-lived players of a standard discounted infinitely-repeated game. Individuals live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes place before their birth, but instead create social memory through private messages received from their immediate predecessors. Under mild conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff vectors (including those below the minmax of the stage game) can be sustained by sequential equilibria of the dynastic repeated game with private communication. In particular, the result applies to any stage game with n  ≥  4 players for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a non-empty interior. We are also able to characterize fully the conditions under which a sequential equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the standard repeated game. For this to be the case it must be that the players’ equilibrium beliefs violate a condition that we term “inter-generational agreement.” A previous version of this paper was circulated as Anderlini et al. (2005). We are grateful to Jeff Ely, Leonardo Felli, Navin Kartik, David Levine, Stephen Morris, Michele Piccione, Andrew Postlewaite, Lones Smith and to seminar audiences at Bocconi, Cambridge, CEPR-Guerzensee, Chicago, Columbia, Edinburgh, Essex, Georgetown, Leicester, LSE, Northwestern, Oxford, Rome (La Sapienza), Rutgers, SAET-Vigo, Stanford, SUNY-Albany, UCL, UC-San Diego, Venice and Yale for helpful feedback.     

Substitutability and weighting of ecological and economic indicators: Exploring the importance of various components of a synthetic index

The establishment of an information system is meaningful to develop a dynamic assessment of environmental quality and degradation. In this paper an original, empirical framework called Factor Weighting Model (FWM) is proposed to integrate different indicators into a composite index. The FWM is able to work with variables depicting different themes (e.g. climate, soil, landscape, demography, economy) collected at various geographical and temporal scales. Three case studies carried out at different spatial scales were considered as examples of FWM application to a composite index of Land Degradation. It consists of several variables collected from various data sources and available at different temporal and spatial scales, which are aggregated into some thematic indicators. The FWM approach was applied separately for each case study to the single variables transformed into sensitivity indicators through standard procedures. A multiway factor analysis (MDA) was carried out to explore over time the relationships among indicators. The importance of the environmental indicators was estimated by attributing a percent weight to each of them according to MDA outputs. Climate and soil dimensions account for the highest weights in all the cases considered. These findings are in accordance with the results obtained in previous studies. The implications of FWM in the assessment of environmental quality are finally discussed.     

A theory of firm decline

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter continues to grow, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained-efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment.     

PAYG pensions, tax-cum-subsidy and A-Pareto efficiency

An overlapping generation’s small open economy with endogenous fertility and time cost of children is analysed to show that the command optimum can be decentralised in a market setting using a PAYG transfer from the young to the old and a tax-cum-subsidy policy (i.e., a linear wage tax on labour income collected and rebated in a lump-sum way within the younger working-age generation). Indeed, the latter instrument stimulates fertility and then reduces the opportunity cost of children. Moreover, by applying the generalised notion of Pareto efficiency introduced by Golosov et al. (2007) in a context of endogenous population, some normative conclusions can be drawn: since only the utilities of those who are actually born are evaluated, we apply the concept of A-efficiency and conclude that when PAYG pensions are in existence, the tax-cum-subsidy policy can effectively be used as an alternative to the child allowance to internalise the externality of children, while also representing an A-Pareto improvement.     

Walras’ theory of capital formation: an intertemporal equilibrium reformulation

We develop a mainstream reformulation of the original Walras?? model of capital accumulation. We overcome the shortcomings of the original model. First, we prove the existence of intertemporal competitive equilibria. Our proof combines a well known theorem due to Yannelis and Prabhakar (J Math Econ 12:233?C245, 1983) with a lemma due to Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 21:585?C603, 2003). Secondly, we remedy the indeterminacy of allocation of savings across multiple types of capital goods by introducing a storage technology. Finally, we show that, for stored capital goods, the equality of rates of returns emerges endogenously in equilibrium, while it was imposed by Walras from the outset in his original contribution.     

Inter-firm knowledge diffusion, market power, and welfare

We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the long run impact of inter-firm knowledge diffusion on market power, i.e. the ability of a firm to raise the price above the marginal cost, and welfare. We consider two types of processes through which knowledge is acquired: (i) passive learning, or learning-by-doing, where managers do not actively invest in information and (ii) active learning, or learning-by-investing, where managers acquire new and additional information through specific investments in human capital. We show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion reduces market power; under (ii), knowledge diffusion reduces market power as long as learning spillovers are sufficiently important. From a welfare viewpoint, we also show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion is always welfare-enhancing; under (ii), weak spillovers are required in order for knowledge diffusion to be welfare-enhancing.