The social value of public information with costly information acquisition

In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.     

Predicting U.S. recessions through a combination of probability forecasts

Recently De Luca and Carfora (Statistica e Applicazioni 8:123–134, 2010) have proposed a novel model for binary time series, the Binomial Heterogenous Autoregressive (BHAR) model, successfully applied for the analysis of the quarterly binary time series of U.S. recessions. In this work we want to measure the efficacy of the out-of-sample forecasts of the BHAR model compared to the probit models by Kauppi and Saikkonen (Rev Econ Stat 90:777–791, 2008). Given the substantial indifference of the predictive accuracy between the BHAR and the probit models, a combination of forecasts using the method proposed by Bates and Granger (Oper Res Q 20:451–468, 1969) for probability forecasts is analyzed. We show how the forecasts obtained by the combination between the BHAR model and each of the probit models are superior compared to the forecasts obtained by each single model.     

Interaction between economic and financial development

This paper presents a model of financial and economic development which assumes the consumption of real resources by the financial sector. Financial development occurs endogenously as the economy reaches a critical threshold of economic development. Compared to financial autarky, financial intermediaries allocate savings, net of their costs of operation, to more productive investments. Whenever the technology financed by intermediaries is more capital-intensive than that operated in financial autarky, the growth effect of financial development is ambiguous. As a result, financial development may be unsustainable. However, when financial development is sustainable, the credit market becomes more competitive and more efficient over time, and this could eventually contribute to economic growth. Nonetheless, given monopolistic competition in the financial sector, the level of entry into the credit market is generally inefficient. For instance, with diminishing returns to specialisation, entrants might be too few at the early stages of economic development and too many later on.     

Firm–bank credit network,business cycle and macroprudential policy

We present an agent-based model to study firm–bank credit market interactions in different phases of the business cycle. The business cycle is exogenously set, and it can give rise to various scenarios. Compared to other models in this literature strand, we improve the mechanism according to which the dividends are distributed, including the possibility of stock repurchase by firms. In addition, we locate firms and banks over a space and firms may ask credit to many banks, resulting in a complex spatial network. The model reproduces a long list of stylized facts and their dynamic evolution as described by the cross-correlations among model variables. The model allows us to test the effectiveness of rules designed by the current financial regulation, such as the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer. We find that the effectiveness of this rule changes in different business cycle environments and this should be considered by policy makers.

     

The Environmental Tax: Effects on Inequality and Growth

Environmental and Resource Economics - Within an R&D-driven growth model, this paper studies how an environmental tax and its cost both for firms and consumers affect individuals’...     

Book Review: Decentralized finance after Bitcoin & Ethereum

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management -     

A spatial theory of urban segregation

We provide a competitive equilibrium theory of urban segregation in a linear city. Households demand consumption and housing along the city and are exposed to neighborhood externalities. We show that equilibria that are robust to small coalitional deviations are segregated. Our results explain urban segregation in a standard neoclassical framework and shed new light on the difficulties faced by authorities to integrate cities.     

Assessing skewness in financial markets

It is a matter of common observation that investors value substantial gains but are averse to heavy losses. Obvious as it may sound, this translates into an interesting preference for right-skewed return distributions, whose right tails are heavier than their left tails. Skewness is thus not only a way to describe the shape of a distribution, but also a tool for risk measurement. We review the statistical literature on skewness and provide a comprehensive framework for its assessment. Then, we present a new measure of skewness, based on the decomposition of variance in its upward and downward components. We argue that this measure fills a gap in the literature and show in a simulation study that it strikes a good balance between robustness and sensitivity.     

Correction to: Semi-analytical prices for lookback and barrier options under the Heston model

Decisions in Economics and Finance - In this note, we point out a mistake in Theorem 1 of De De Gennaro Aquino and Bernard (Decis Econ Finance 42(2):715–741, 2019) and provide some missing...     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.