Correction: Technology and productivity growth

Business Economics -     

Securities class actions in the US banking sector: Between investor protection and bank stability

This paper investigates whether securities class actions (SCAs) can play a role in banking supervision, both as a warning signal of insolvency and as an instrument of market discipline to encourage bank managers to carefully evaluate risk. Two groups of US banks are compared over the 2000–2008 period. One includes banks that have faced at least one SCA, while the other is composed of non-targeted banks (control group). Results indicate that collective private litigation procedures are more frequently directed at financially fragile intermediaries exhibiting inadequate governance standards. Furthermore, banks which have been subjected to SCAs are likely to reduce their excessive risk positions. This supports the idea that SCAs could be efficiently employed as a complement to public supervisory activity in the banking sector.     

Fair allocation in networks with externalities

I prove existence and uniqueness of a component efficient and fair allocation rule when the value of the network is allowed to exhibit any type of externalities across its components. This is done by means of a new specification of the value function, generalizing partial results appearing in Myerson [Myerson, R.B., 1977a. Graphs and cooperation in games. Math. Operations Res. 2, 225–229], Feldman [Feldman, B.E., 1996. Bargaining, coalition formation and value. PhD dissertation. State University of New York at Stony Brook] and Jackson and Wolinsky [Jackson, M.O., Wolinsky, A., 1996. A strategic model of social and economic networks. J. Econ. Theory 71, 44–74]. This component efficient and fair allocation rule is found closely related to an extension of the Shapley value to TU-games in partition function form proposed by Myerson [Myerson, R.B., 1977b. Values of games in partition function form. Int. J. Game Theory 6 (1), 23–31].     

“Informing” technologies and the World Bank

The current study examines how the World Bank uses an assemblage of information generation and reporting practices, bounded by accounting/financial expertises, to attempt to influence the practices associated with administering education in Latin America. Starting from the premise that these “informing” technologies make the objects of governance knowable in terms of accounting and financial expertises, we consider how accounting practices embedded within lending agreements enable, translate and regulate behaviour. Focusing on the institutional field(s) of basic education, the study offers an in-depth analysis of 15 World Bank loan agreements from across the region, plus 25 interviews with field participants from a single Latin American country. We examine how the World Bank lending agreements install a variety of informing technologies across a network of agents in Latin America. We propose that such agreements can be viewed as technologies of governance in that they diffuse financial technologies to distant fields, re-structure the habitus of these fields, and serve to reaffirm the expertise of the Bank within these fields. In this way, the World Bank increases its legitimacy with other potential borrower countries and ensures its continuing influence.     

THE IDENTIFICATION AND ECONOMIC CONTENT OF ORDERED CHOICE MODELS WITH STOCHASTIC THRESHOLDS*

This article extends the widely used ordered choice model by introducing stochastic thresholds and interval‐specific outcomes. The model can be interpreted as a generalization of the GAFT (MPH) framework for discrete duration data that jointly models durations and outcomes associated with different stopping times. We establish conditions for nonparametric identification. We interpret the ordered choice model as a special case of a general discrete choice model and as a special case of a dynamic discrete choice model.     

Foreign direct investment in the banking sector: the case of Italian banks in the '90s

The present paper addresses the issue of the determinants of the growth of multinational banks upon foreign markets at a micro individual level. Theories and approaches suggested so far about globalisation of the banking sector basically relate banks' international growth to the theory of the multinational enterprise. Accordingly, this paper relies on the eclectic paradigm, which views the foreign direct investment decision to be a combination of ownership, internalisation and location advantages. Empirical evidence is provided through an econometric model based on count data techniques, with reference to the Italian case in the decade 1989–1999. Results show that the availability of resources and international experience already gathered by the parent banks have positive effects on their decision to undertake direct investments abroad. Multinational banks are also proved to grow internationally in order to internalise their pre-existing bank–client relationships, and to locate their foreign units where they can exploit positive externalities related to the presence of important international financial centres.     

Participatory democracy and political opportunism: municipal experience in Italy and Spain (1960–93)

The relationship between local scale and participatory democracy is one of the main issues of normative theory of democracy. This article tries to show that the development of this model of democracy also depends on institutional factors. In his political opportunism hypothesis the author proposes that local governments have to develop adaptive strategies to make electoral victory compatible with offers of opportunities of participation: on the one hand, because the parties have to make government or opposition action compatible between local and central political levels; on the other, because the supply of participation presupposes the redistribution of power among local interest groups and the possibility of imposing limits over local government actions. To test this hypothesis, the author analyses data on citizen participation among Italian and Spanish local governments by qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). In conclusion, the author argues that political opportunism could limit local democratization and new urban governance initiatives. La relation entre échelle locale et démocratie participative constitue l'une des grandes questions de la théorie normative de la démocratie. L'auteur tente de montrer que l'élaboration de ce modèle de démocratie dépend aussi de facteurs institutionnels. Dans son hypothèse d'opportunisme politique, il propose que les gouvernements locaux mettent au point des stratégies adaptatives afin de rendre toute victoire électorale compatible avec les possibilités de participation offertes, d'un côté parce que les parties doivent rendre compatibles les actions du gouvernement ou de l'opposition entre les niveaux politiques local et central, de l'autre parce qu'une participation potentielle présuppose la redistribution du pouvoir entre groupes d'intérêt locaux et la capacité d'imposer des limites aux actions gouvernementales locales. Cette hypothèse est testée par l'analyse de données sur la participation des citoyens dans les gouvernements locaux italiens et espagnols via une analyse comparative qualitative. La conclusion déduit qu'un opportunisme politique pourrait entraver des initiatives de démocratisation locale et de gouvernance urbaine originale.     

Cultural boundaries of self-justification and prospect theories in escalation of commitment: a US–Mexico comparison

The interplay among managers' cultural origin (i.e. Mexican vs. the USA), decision context and framing was investigated to test the cultural boundaries of self-justification and prospect theories in escalation of commitment. An experimental design indicated that, although a negative decision frame had a greater impact on escalation of commitment among Mexican managers, a positive frame had a greater impact on escalation of commitment among American managers. Moreover, a pattern indicating that framing had an opposite effect in each country emerged when the decision context was negative. Specifically, when the incoming information is positive, US decision-makers escalate their commitment to a failing course of action, whereas it is negative incoming information that leads to escalation for Mexican decision-makers.     

Behaviour Change for Sustainable Consumption

Journal of Consumer Policy -