A performance analysis of participating life insurance contracts

Traditional life insurance products, in particular participating life insurance contracts, are often criticized. Their performance is often said to be poor compared to other investment alternatives. Interestingly, this perception appears to persist although very little research has been conducted into the performance of participating life insurance contracts. But are participating life insurance contracts actually bad for policyholders? We conduct a performance analysis based on contracts offered in the German market, in order to provide evidence to support decision making by policyholders.     

Borrowing constraints,the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance

When it is costly for individuals to save or to borrow, unemployment insurance (UI) provides an alternative source of liquidity that smooths consumption over time and leads individuals to spend longer unemployed searching for a suitable job. We show in a tractable life-cycle model how the optimal unemployment replacement ratio and the fall in consumption on job loss depend on the cost of self-insurance and the cost of borrowing. This implies that the value of UI depends on age at job loss, consumption needs (such as the presence of children), discount rates, the return on saving, access to credit and the presence of other social insurance programmes. Optimal replacement rates vary substantially with plausible variation in these factors (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent).     

Proving regularity of the minimal probability of ruin via a game of stopping and control

We reveal an interesting convex duality relationship between two problems: (a) minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin when the rate of consumption is stochastic and the individual can invest in a Black–Scholes financial market; (b) a controller-and-stopper problem, in which the controller controls the drift and volatility of a process in order to maximize a running reward based on that process, and the stopper chooses the time to stop the running reward and pays the controller a final amount at that time. Our primary goal is to show that the minimal probability of ruin, whose stochastic representation does not have a classical form as does the utility maximization problem (i.e., the objective’s dependence on the initial values of the state variables is implicit), is the unique classical solution of its Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation, which is a non-linear boundary-value problem. We establish our goal by exploiting the convex duality relationship between (a) and (b).     

American options and callable bonds under stochastic interest rates and endogenous bankruptcy

A new characterization of the American-style option is proposed under a very general multifactor Markovian and diffusion framework. The efficiency of the proposed pricing solutions is shown to depend only on the use of a viable valuation method for the corresponding European-style option and for the transition density of the model’s state variables. Under a Gauss-Markov stochastic interest rates setup, these new American option pricing solutions are shown to offer a much better accuracy-efficiency trade-off than the approximations already available in the literature. This result is also used to price callable corporate bonds under an endogenous bankruptcy structural approach, by decomposing the option to call or default into a European put on the firm value plus two early exercise premium components.     

Tariffs versus VAT in the presence of heterogeneous firms and an informal sector

The debate over the use of tariffs or value added taxes in developing countries has focused on the difficulty of collecting VAT from the informal sector. This paper contributes by considering this issue with heterogeneous firms and endogenous entry. This yields two results. First, a cut in the tariff reduces the size of the informal sector. Second, the imposition of VAT need not increase the size of the informal sector. Turning to simulation results, we find that switching from a tariff to a revenue-neutral VAT increases welfare, in part because of the selection effect generated by heterogeneous firms.     

The efficient hedging problem for American options

In this paper, we prove the existence of efficient partial hedging strategies for a trader unable to commit the initial minimal amount of money needed to implement a hedging strategy for an American option. The attitude towards the shortfall is modeled in terms of a decreasing and convex risk functional satisfying a lower semicontinuity property with respect to the Fatou convergence of stochastic processes. Some relevant examples of risk functionals are analyzed. Numerical computations in a discrete-time market model are provided. In a Lévy market, an approximating solution is given assuming discrete-time trading.     

How well do investors understand loss persistence?

This paper examines investors’ expectations of loss persistence. I develop a model to forecast loss firms’ future earnings based on Joos and Plesko, The Accounting Review 80: 847–870, (2005). This model produces smaller forecast errors than two random walk models and a model that assumes losses are transitory. The results suggest that investors do not fully distinguish the differences in loss persistence captured by the model and instead appear to assume that all losses are transitory. Consequently, investors are surprised by future announcements of negative earnings for firms with predicted persistent losses, and these firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns over the following four quarters. Additional results indicate that the future negative returns of firms with predicted persistent losses are smaller in magnitude when these firms are followed by analysts. The results are robust to controls for various price anomalies and are not driven by short sale constraints.     

Temporary immigration visas

This paper deals with recent proposals concerning temporary immigration visas as a means to combat the problem of illegal immigration. We set up a simple two-period model of international migration between a poor South and a rich North with temporary visas issued for one period. Because of capital market imperfections, immigrants from the South face additional capital costs when financing the visa fee. In this model, we find that temporary visas can improve welfare in the North if capital costs of the immigrants are sufficiently low. For high capital costs, however, a welfare reduction cannot be ruled out. We extend the model to the case of heterogeneous immigrants and asymmetric information. In this setting, we show that the government in the North may have an incentive to issue temporary visas for those with low capital costs and to tolerate illegal immigration of the others.