What is different about urban activities of those with access to ICTs? Some early evidence from Québec,Canada

The first wave, conducted in 2002–2003, of an in-depth panel survey in Quebec City, was used to compare the out-of-home activities of adults who had the use of mobile phones, or of internet at home, to those who did not. A unique feature of the survey was the inclusion of respondents’ perceptions of the both the temporal and the spatial flexibility of all executed activities. We find, after statistical controls for other factors, that mobile phone use was positively associated with activity and trip levels, while internet access was negatively associated. These two ICTs also had mostly opposite relationships with the routinisation and pre-arrangement of activities and with some conventionally defined sub-classes of activity.     

PPP EXCHANGE RATE RULES,MACROECONOMIC (IN)STABILITY,AND LEARNING*

In order to maintain competitiveness, governments in developing economies seem to have pursued purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate rules, by adjusting the nominal devaluation rate in response to real exchange rate deviations from an intermediate target. This article shows that these rules are likely to induce macroeconomic instability, as they generate sunspot‐driven fluctuations that are in fact learnable by agents in the Expectational‐Stability sense. It finds that the existence of these “learnable sunspots” depends, among others, on open economy features, including the degree of openness and the degree of exchange rate pass‐through to consumer's import prices.     

Persistent gaps and default traps

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income, raising the cost of future repayments, thereby creating “default traps”. We build a long and broad cross-country dataset to show the existence of a history-dependent “default premium” and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness, consistent with the model's predictions.     

Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.     

Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers

In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two ex-ante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independent private valuations. I find the ex-ante utilitarian-optimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as “numeraire” to purchase probability units of the other object. I characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries, auctions and insurance. The latter element ensures that efficient auctions are feasible. If the problem is constrained to guarantee exactly one object per agent, then the optimal mechanism uses no information other than the agents? ordinal preferences.     

Pricing of a structured product on the SX5E when the uncertainty of returns is modeled as a log-stable process

This work presents the participation factor and the valuation of a first-generation structured product with European call options on the Eurostoxx, when the uncertainty of the yields is modeled through log-stable processes. The basic statistics of the index yields are also exposed, the α-stable parameters are estimated, and the valuation of the of the structured models is compared through the log-stable and log-Gaussian models using inputs from the bond markets; concluding that investors obtain higher yields than those of the bond market through both models, and that the differences of the yields depend on the participation factor and on the value of the index at the time of liquidation.     

Promoting justice by treating people unequally: an experimental study

Which inequalities among individuals are considered unjust? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study distributive choices dealing with arbitrarily unequal initial endowments. In a three-person distribution problem where subjects either know or do not know their endowments, we find impartial behavior to be a stable pattern. Subjects either compensate for initial inequalities fully or not at all in both conditions, and they do so more often when they do not know their endowment than when they know it. Moreover, the type and the size of the good to be distributed also affect the frequency of impartial behavior.