Does self-regulation work? Experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of Self-Regulatory Organizations

Self-regulation (SR) is a common way of enforcing quality in markets (such as banking, financial services and several professions) and in a variety of public and private organizations. We provide experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to publicly disclose versus cover-up fraud in an incomplete information environment. We find that observed behaviour is generally consistent with Bayesian equilibrium when subjects are informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by a ‘vigilant’ versus a ‘lax’ SRO type. In particular, a fraud disclosure equilibrium is supported when subjects are informed that the ‘vigilant’ SRO is more likely to detect fraud; otherwise, a cover-up equilibrium is supported. However, when subjects are not informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by the SRO types (as expected in real SR situations), no equilibrium is strongly supported. Our results suggest that in practice, the reputation-based incentives for effective SR may be inherently ambiguous and weak.     

A seasonal fractional multivariate model. A testing procedure and impulse responses for the analysis of GDP and unemployment dynamics

This paper deals with the analysis of seasonally, fractionally integrated, multivariate models. We present a procedure that permits us to test the seasonal fractional differencing parameters from the reduced-form system, which allows us to recover the parameters of the structural model through simple restrictions as in the standard VAR case with the additional incorporation of seasonality and fractional integration. An empirical application based on a bivariate system using GDP and unemployment in the UK, USA and Japan is also carried out at the end of the paper.     

Risk compensation in wages – a replication

We use data from Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to test for the effect of earnings variation on individual earnings. We replicate estimates for the USA and find that the variance of earnings in an occupation affects individual wages positively while the skewness of earnings has a negative effect. Both results are in conformity with wage compensation for risk averse workers. First version received: March 2001/Final version received: July 2002 We are grateful to two anonymous referees for valuable comments.     

Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance

We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.     

Unit and Fractional Roots at the Long Run and the Seasonal Frequencies in Macroeconomic Time Series

In this article, we show that macroeconomic time series may contain unit and fractional roots at both, at zero and at zero and at the seasonal frequencies. The importance of the root at the long run or zero frequency requires in many cases to consider this root at both, separately in an independent polynomial, and also included in the seasonal one. Several Monte Carlo experiments are conducted to examine cases when the root at the zero frequency is not appropriately considered. An empirical application based on the tests of Robinson, Peter M. “Efficient Tests of Nonstationary Hypotheses,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89, 1994, pp. 1420–37 is also carried out at the end of the article.The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Government of Navarra (“Ayudas de Formación e Investigación y Desarrollo”).     

Modeling population dynamics and economic growth as competing species: An application to CO2 global emissions

Since the beginning of the last century the world is experiencing an important demographic transition, which will probably impact on economic growth. Many demographers and social scientists are trying to understand the key drivers of such transition as well as its profound implications. A correct understanding will help to predict other important trends of the world primary energy demand and the carbon emission to the atmosphere, which may be leading to an important climate change. This paper proposes a set of coupled differential equations to describe the changes of population, gross domestic product, primary energy consumption and carbon emissions, modeled as competing species as in Lotka-Volterra prey-predator relations. The predator-prey model is well known in the biological, ecological and environmental literature and has also been applied successfully in other fields. This model proposes a new and simple conceptual explanation of the interactions and feedbacks among the principal driving forces leading to the present transition. The estimated results for the temporal evolution of world population, gross domestic product, primary energy consumption and carbon emissions are calculated from year 1850 to year 2150. The calculated scenarios are in good agreement with common world data and projections for the next 100 years.     

Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems

Summary. Although not assumed explicitly, we show that neutrality plays an important role in Arrow and other impossibility theorems. Applying it to pivotal voters we produce direct proofs of classical impossibility theorems, including Arrow's, as well as extend some of these theorems. We further explore the role of neutrality showing that it is equivalent to Pareto or reverse Pareto, and to effective dictatorship for non-null social welfare functions satisfying the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is also equivalent to Wilson's Citizens' Sovereignty--which is related to the intuition that symmetry over alternatives makes social preference depend only on citizens' preferences. We show that some of these results are more fundamental than others in that they extend both to infinite societies and to considerably smaller domains of preferences. Finally, as an application of Arrow's theorem, we provide a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.Received: 13 April 2000, Revised: 6 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, C70.I thank Salvador Barberá, Luis Corchón, Cesar Martinelli, Eric Maskin, Tomas Sjöström, Ricard Torres, José Pedro Ubeda, and an anonymous referee for feedback. The proofs of Arrow's theorem and two Wilson's theorems come from a note I wrote in 1987 at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (Ubeda [16]). In 1996 Geanakoplos [7] wrote a proof of Arrow's theorem similar but not identical to mine. All work in this paper is independent of his.     

Environmental orientation in tourism: the RTEO scale

This paper analysed the validity and reliability of the revised tourist ecological orientation (RTEO) scale. There are relatively few studies in the area of the ecological behaviour of tourists and, therefore, RTEO and other scales should be taken into account in future tourism research. This study is based on a sample of 461 golf tourists. A double analysis was carried out: (1) a qualitative analysis through expert opinion and (2) a quantitative analysis through the partial least squares approach. The results suggest that the RTEO scale is a brief, simple and reliable scale of environmental actions.