What type of cooperation with suppliers and customers leads to superior performance?

This research evaluates cooperation with key suppliers and customers, correlating cooperation to financial performance. Four cooperative behaviors represent cooperation as a multidimensional concept and the research explores the effect of each of these different dimensions of cooperation on performance. Results show that not all cooperative behaviors have similar and positive impacts on performance. Flexibility has no significant effect while shared problem solving has a negative effect. The other two cooperative behaviors, information exchange and restraint in the use of power, have positive impacts on performance. Results also indicate that cooperation with customers affects mostly firm growth while cooperation with suppliers affects firm profitability. Based on a survey of 124 packaging manufacturers, the analysis uses CFA (Confirmatory Factor Analysis) to validate the measurement of constructs and multiple regressions to analyze the relationships between the cooperative behaviors and financial performance.     

A Probability of Revisitation Model: The Case of Winter Visits to the Grand Canyon

This paper finds that on average first-time visitors to the Grand Canyon are willing to travel significantly greater distances than repeat visitors. These findings are based upon a binary logit model of repeat visitations estimated from a recent sample of Grand Canyon visitors. This model expresses the probability of repeat visitation as a function of distance travelled and visitor demographic profiles. Included among the demographic characteristics are income, available leisure time, and the number of previous visits. An important managerial implication of this study - not only for the Grand Canyon but also for other tourist destinations - is the value of ‘probability of revisitation’ approach in identifying subtle market fragments. This opens the door to sophisticated marketing strategies that, in this case, cater to the separate needs and desires of repeat and first-time visitors to enhance revenue possibilities.     

Modeling and forecasting tourism demand: the case of flows from Mainland China to Taiwan

The study of tourism demand is attracting more and more attention. Hence, it is important to understand the variables that affect tourism demand and to forecast the demand. Many studies have been conducted to analyze the demands in various countries. Recently, China has been expected to become one of the largest originators of outbound tourists in the world. Hence, it is interesting to explore what the variables are that affect the Mainland Chinese arrivals to Taiwan and to forecast its corresponding tourism demand. This study applies neural networks to select proper models, and then to forecast the demand.     

On the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Constraints to the Real Side of the Economy

Contrary to the predictions of the theory underlying international finance, inflows of capital triggered by financial liberalisation have neither equalised real interest rates nor increased income growth in many emerging economies. We explain this puzzle by developing a model that combines the balance‐of‐payments constraint approach to economic growth with a less stringent version of the real interest rate parity hypothesis. The model’s foundations are based on robust empirical findings or well‐established macroeconomic models. We show that a perverse combination of income elasticities of demand for imports and exports generates slow income growth and high real interest rates. As domestic income grows and imports rise faster than exports, the real exchange rate is expected to depreciate in order to clear the balance of payments (or the foreign exchange rate market). An incipient capital outflow arises and interest rates increase. Faster adjustment in capital rather than in the goods market therefore generates a higher real interest rate differential between the domestic small open‐economy and the rest of the world. The long run analysis shows that a constant degree of risk aversion implies a positive equilibrium real interest rate differential that affects economic growth. A permanent increase in default risk driven by persistent current account imbalances thus impacts on long run growth. The model’s results are illustrated with evidence from the three major Latin America economies: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.     

Currency Substitution and Money Demand in Euroland

This paper tests the stability of the demand for money in the euro-area in the context of an open economy. A sample consisting of quarterly data covering the 1982:2–1999:3 period is considered. The main finding is that the U.S. dollar long-term interest rate plays a significant role in the European money demand relationship. This result holds for different combinations of variables forming the vector auto-regressive system and suggests that international monetary interdependency may be an important factor influencing the ECB monetary policy.This paper draws on an earlier version and was prepared while the author was at the Bank of Portugal (the usual disclaimer applies). It was presented at the 2003 Meeting of the Economic Modelling Network. The author acknowledges Luis Catela Nunes, Carlos Santos, Carlos Robalo Marques, Nuno Alves, and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions.     

Renegotiation in Public–Private Partnerships: An Incentive Mechanism Approach

Game theory is an important analytical tool for measuring problems caused by behaviors that deviate from contractual ethics. However, the PPP literature still does little to explore this research topic. This paper analyzes and improves the equilibrium conditions of a renegotiation model of PPPs by introducing the asymmetry of information in the contract. To achieve this goal, the Mechanism Design Theory is used to demonstrate how the correct tracking of the investor directly influences the payoffs of the renegotiation. The study concludes that the lack of incentive constraints in the bidding document, as an ex ante condition, does not provide sufficient information on investor management capability. In this way, this information is only revealed in the renegotiation phase. Consequently, this contract failure results in high political costs to the government due to excessive subsidies.