Time on Welfare

A bstract . Long-term welfare participation by women is examined using data from Akron , Ohio. Age at entry to welfare, previous work experience , and number of children are the best predictors of long-term welfare use. Race and education are not statistically significant. Changes in family structure are the major reason why women enter welfare. But labor market reasons predortant for married couples. Labor market reasons are the most important reason why women leave the welfare system. For "high risk" women, welfare is less a safety net than a dependency trap. Public policy should focus on pregnancy among high-risk teens.     

A Test of the Conditional CAPM with Simultaneous Estimation of the First and Second Conditional Moments

Recent studies of the conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) are extended by modeling the first and second conditional moments separately, but estimating them jointly, allowing the isolation of time-varying influences in the different moments. Results support evidence that both conditional moments and conditional risk parameters are time varying, and help shed light on previous rejections of the conditional CAPM. The GMM test of the over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the null that the CAPM holds through time when a non-linear specification is used, and only weakly rejects the null with a linear specification.     

The effects of casino gambling on state tax revenue

A theoretical model of state tax structure implies that revenue enhancement due to the introduction of casino gambling is less likely in states where incomes taxes do not exist and where casino tax rates are lower than the corresponding tax rates on sales taxable and excise taxable goods. Further, it is clear that casino gambling is likely to adversely impact lottery tax revenues earmarked for education. Due to the cross-price effects of gambling, tax revenues will likely decline in states that introduce nontaxable casino gambling on Indian reservations. In the longer term, as casino gambling proliferates increasing competition among states, there will be negative revenue consequences due to fewer tourism and employment dollars.     

Adverse selection as an explanation of credit rationing and different lender types

An adverse selection model is utilized to demonstrate that informational asymmetry may make it wealth optimal for the financial intermediary (FI) to credit ration and to rationalize the existence of different lenders in the credit market. The crucial assumption is that borrowers differ in their tolerance for a lender-imposed default penalty, the severity of which also varies with the lender. The credit rationing portion proves that the FI will: 1) be forced by a binding regulatory constraint to overinvest in capital; 2) ration its worst risk class borrowers; 3) establish its optimal loan interest rate on the basis of the average quality of its loans and the interest rate elasticity of the borrower demand in its best risk category; and 4) decrease the total loan volume and increase the loan interest rate due to an increase in the capital requirement, but the effect on the default risk quality of its loan portfolio is ambiguous. The existence result is that if a lender has a high default penalty, he can charge a lower rate and attract only “good” borrowers, i.e., heterogeneous lender types encourage the screening of borrowers and vice versa.     

How deficiencies in motivation to manage contribute to the United States' competitiveness problem (and what can be done about it)

Data are presented to support the argument that motivation to manage is a major cause of managerial effectiveness, that it declined sharply in the college population during the activism of the 1960s and early 1970s, and that it is now severely lacking in the United States relative to many other countries. Thus America's competitiveness problems appear to be largely motivational in nature. Possible solutions are discussed, including recruiting and selecting for managerial motivation, increasing motivation to manage using training and development techniques, and changing organizational designs (telescoping the scalar chain, moving managerial tasks into non-managerial positions, resorting to professional forms, and expanding venture structures). © 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.