Measuring Compliance with the Golden Rule

The golden rule of public finance is based upon the notin that intergenerational equity requires that the cost of public expenditures be spread over time in a manner that reflects the intertemporal distribution of the benefits generated by those expenditures. This is often translated into a rule that the budget be structurally balanced in accrual accounting terms. This article considers the form of accrual accounting that is most suited to the task of measuring the consistency of fiscal policy with the golden rule. It recommends a combination of the real capital maintenance approach (also known as ‘current purchasing power accounting’) and annuity depreciation. Such an approach differs from ‘current cost accounting’, which has dominated public sector models of accrual accounting in recent years. The meaning of balance-sheet measures is also considered, and it is concluded that the golden rule is more appropriately expressed as an accrual balanced budget requirement than as a requirement for the maintenance of constant net worth. JEL classification: H6, M40.     

Forward and Futures Prices: Evidence from the Foreign Exchange Markets

Empirical studies of the Treasury Bill markets have revealed substantial differences between the futures price and the implied forward price. These differences have been attributed to taxes, transaction costs, and the settling up procedure employed in the futures market. This paper examines the forward and futures prices in foreign exchange in an attempt to distinguish between the competing explanations.     

MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES: MEETINGS AND OUTCOMES

Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper, we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behavior of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on preprepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) under Chairman Bernanke. (JEL E58, D71, D78)     

Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and Their Subclass of Data Games

The axiom of balanced collective contributions is introduced as a collective variant of the axiom of balanced contributions proposed by Myerson. It requires the identical average impact of the withdrawal of any agent from a game on the remaining population. It turns out that the axiom of balanced collective contributions and the classical axiom of efficiency characterize the equal allocation of nonseparable costs, an allocation rule that is extensively used in cost allocation problems and in accounting. In particular, the equal allocation of nonseparable costs coincides with the nucleolus on the class of data games within the European REACH legislation. While our result does not hold on data games, extra axioms enable provision of comparable characterizations of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs and the Shapley value on this class of games.     

The spread of empire: Clio and the measurement of colonial borrowing costs1

Modern cliometric studies use dummy variables to measure the effects of institutions. The dummy variable approach can be misleading, as illustrated by recent research on the impact of colonial rule on borrowing terms. We show how trying to measure a ‘colonial effect’ without an analysis of the financial consequences of political subjection can be misleading. The main effect of the British Empire was to remove the default risk. Establishing how this was done, and with what effects, should take us closer to a proper understanding of the effect of empire.     

Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century1

In this article we develop new tools to survey the development of lending‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century. One finding is that free lending and extensive liquidity support against good collateral developed gradually after 1847, and was already a fact of life before Bagehot published Lombard Street. Another is that the extension of the Bank of England's lender‐of‐last‐resort function went along with a reduction of its exposure to default risks, in contrast with accounts that have associated lending of last resort with moral hazard. Finally, we provide a new interpretation of the ‘high rates’ advocated by Bagehot. We suggest they were meant to prevent banks from free‐riding on the safety offered by the central bank, and were aimed at forcing them to keep lending during crises so as to maintain a critical degree of liquidity in the money market.