SAVING ENERGY THROUGH BETTER INFORMATION: A NEW ENERGY PARADIGM?

For the past 40 years, governments, utilities, and private companies have developed increasingly efficient appliances for household use and governments have initiated policies to encourage the deployment of these technologies. To the credit of these activities, we have improved the efficiency of electricity use in the United States, but it has not been enough to overcome the increasing demand from proliferation of electricity‐using devices. In addition, penetration rates for some types of efficient equipment have remained relatively low in certain regions. U.S. electricity demand thus continues to grow. In this paper, we argue that to achieve significantly greater efficiency improvements needed to meet future demand for energy services, we should provide more information to consumers about their energy use and give them more control over this use. While more studies are needed to assess just how far these types of measures can take us, there is enough evidence to show that with better information, consumers often make choices that reduce energy use.     

SENIORITY WAGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*

Economies that lack well‐developed markets for mobilizing household savings may, in some instances, grow faster than those that are financially more developed, provided that their labour markets are also characterized by seniority rather than spot wages. This occurs because of a Kaldorian redistribution effect in a model where households have finite‐horizons and where older workers, as an endogenous feature, have higher saving rates.     

Inflation and Unit Labor Cost

We study two decompositions of inflation, π, motivated by the standard New Keynesian pricing equation of Gali, Gertler, and Sbordone. The first uses four components: lagged π, expected future π, real unit labor cost (ψ), and a residual. The second uses two components: fundamental inflation (discounted expected future ψ) and a residual. We find large low‐frequency differences between actual and fundamental inflation. From 1999 to 2011 fundamental inflation fell by more than 15 percentage points, while actual inflation changed little. We discuss this discrepancy in terms of the data (a large drop in labor's share of income) and through the lens of a canonical structural model.     

The Effects of Industry Specialization on Auditors' Inherent Risk Assessments and Confidence Judgements*

This study experimentally examines how industry specialization affects auditors' inherent risk assessments and their confidence in those risk assessments. Two groups of participants ‐ experienced banking specialist auditors and equally experienced nonbanking auditors ‐ provided inherent risk assessments for a hypothetical banking client for two financial statement accounts. They assessed inherent risk for an industry‐specific account (loans receivable) and for a nonindustry‐specific account (property and equipment). The results indicate that nonbanking auditors assessed inherent risk significantly higher than industry specialists for all but the valuation assertion for the loans receivable account. However, the difference between the nonbanking auditors' and banking specialists' inherent risk assessments was not as great for the property and equipment account. Further, nonspecialists were less confident about the appropriateness of their inherent risk assessments compared with industry specialists. Potential implications for research and practice are discussed in light of the study's findings.     

DEMOCRACY AND DE FACTO EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES

This paper explores the relationship between a country's political regime type and its de facto exchange rate fixity. It argues that more democratic regimes should be associated with less de facto fixity because the median voter is likely to be a domestically oriented producer with a monetary preference for domestic policy autonomy, requiring more a more flexible exchange rate regime. Focusing on a broad sample of country–years in the post‐Bretton Woods era defined by international capital mobility, the statistical results show that not only are more democratic regimes negatively associated with de facto fixity using three different operational measures for this dependent variable, but that this negative relationship gets stronger as the median voter is more likely to be a domestically oriented producer and as societal groups are more able to influence public policy.     

The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany's armed forces, 1924–9

Weimar's politicians used to attribute the continuous budget crises after the currency stabilization of 1923–4 to the burden put on the German economy by the Treaty of Versailles, in particular the reparation payments. This argument, which is still popular, neglects the fact that the restriction of the German military to 115,000 men relieved the German central budget considerably. In a counterfactual analysis we assess the savings in additional military costs and compare them to the reparation payments. Depending on the character of the foreign policy pursued by an unrestricted Germany, we find that the net effect of the Treaty's stipulations on the German central budgets was either much lower than hitherto thought or even positive. This finding gives support to the argument that Germany suffered from home‐made political failure even in the relatively stable period from 1924 to 1929.