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211.
Incentivizing Calculated Risk‐Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers 下载免费PDF全文
We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance compensation affects risk assessment and lending. High‐powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect is muted, however, by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer compensation contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect loan officer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not vary with traits such as risk‐aversion, optimism, or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentives distort the assessment of credit risk, even among professionals with many years of experience. 相似文献
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We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design. 相似文献