STABILIZATION POLICY, LEARNING-BY-DOING, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper shows that fiscal policy, when used for stabilizationpurposes, can have a positive effect on the economy's growth,on human capital accumulation, and on welfare. We introducestochastic productivity shocks into a model in which productivityis augmented through learning-by-doing If future benefits oflearning-by-doing are not fully internalized by workers, thenrecessions are periods in which opportunities for acquiringexperience are foregone. We identify configurations of disturbancesand other parameters for which a countercyclical policy maximizesgrowth and welfare.     

LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT: MICRO EVIDENCE FROM UK ESTABLISHMENTS

In this paper we study how firms react to demand shocks, examininghow different aspects of flexibility shape their responses.Our main findings are: (i) very few firms choose to adjust pricein response to a demand shock; (ii) firms with more flexibilityare more likely to respond to demand shocks by adjusting employmentand hours. Our results provide a microeconomic explanation forrecent macroeconomic evidence that labour input has become moreclosely aligned to the business cycle.     

INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL AND COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS

This paper explores the possibilities for complex dynamic behaviourin an industry where a fixed capital good, once acquired andinstalled, is specific to that industry. A central theme isto understand the sorts of factors which can impose bounds onthe behaviour of market price and which can impart stabilityto the system. The analysis highlights the significance notonly of the durability and specificity of physical capital goodsbut also of capacity (under-) utilisation decisions and of thecautiousness of producers when expanding their capacities.     

Disciplining the ‘black sheep of the Balkans’: financial supervision and sovereignty in Bulgaria, 1902–38

Using the example of Bulgaria, we argue that familiar models of international political economy fail to capture the tension between national sovereignty and access to capital markets experienced by peripheral debtors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Existing accounts exaggerate the significance of the gold standard as a good housekeeping seal of approval and underestimate the role of direct financial controls. Furthermore, they underestimate the linkage in zones of inter‐imperial rivalry, such as the Balkans, between foreign borrowing and strategic alignment. We show how Bulgaria found its politics destabilized prior to 1914 by the demands of its creditors. After defeat in the First World War, Bulgaria was forced to submit to an even tighter system of creditor control. Though it obtained substantial debt relief during the 1930s, these concessions were gained not through an assertion of national sovereignty and default, but at the price of even closer supervision. This in turn casts new light on the conventional view of Bulgaria as a victim of Nazi ‘informal imperialism’. In light of Bulgaria's previous experience, the more striking feature of its trade relations with Hitler's Germany is that they were conducted on a basis of sovereign equality.     

Funds Statements and the Two-Entity Test: A Reponse

Robb (1985) criticizes the two-entity test proposed by McKinnon et al. (1983) as confusing and contradictory. This reply demonstrates that his criticisms also are confusing and contradictory.     

Do Firms Adjust Their Timely Loss Recognition in Response to Changes in the Banking Industry?

This paper investigates the impact of changes in the banking sector on firms’ timely recognition of economic losses. In particular, we focus on the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s, which likely causes an exogenous increase in lender demand for timely loss recognition. Analyzing variation in both the timing and the location of the new foreign banks’ entries, we find that foreign bank entry is associated with more timely loss recognition and this increase is positively related to a firm's subsequent debt levels. The change appears driven by a shift in firms’ incentives to supply additional information to lenders and lenders seem to value this information. The increase in timely loss recognition is also concentrated among firms more dependent on external financing: private firms, smaller firms, and nongroup firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that a firm's accounting choices respond to changes in the banking industry.     

The Market for Conflicted Advice

We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. Although conflicted fees lead to distorted information, they are irrelevant for customers' welfare: banning conflicted fees improves only the information quality, not customers' welfare. Instead, financial literacy education for the least informed customers can improve all customers' welfare because of a spillover effect. Furthermore, customers who trade through advisers realize lower average returns, which rationalizes empirical findings.     

(Why) Do Central Banks Care about Their Profits?

We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.