GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE

Abstract The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5% to 1% lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth. One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market‐friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by ongoing research.     

Pyrrhic victories – anticipating the closedown effect

Previous studies with empirical evidence on social responsible driven closedowns have identified a productivity increase effect that occurs during the process of organizational closedowns, known as the closedown effect. Our proposition is that this effect can be anticipated as a consequence of a closedown decision. Encountering four different non social responsible closedown cases, of various durations, we statistically test this proposition. Further, we identify a need for an analytical distinction of the phases of the closedown process, in terms of the primary ‘advanced notice period’ and the secondary ‘countdown period’. Based on the analysis, and with this distinction, we are able to conclude that the productivity increase effect can be anticipated during the countdown period. The comparably longer time frame in the Studding case provides the strongest support for our proposition. From the analysis we suggest hypotheses for further research.     

The Effects of Average Norm Model Regulation: The Case of Electricity Distribution in Sweden

Following the reform of energy sectors, some countries have used engineering norm models in incentive regulation of network utilities. In 2003, Sweden adopted this approach to regulation of electricity distribution networks. This paper examines whether the norm models represent the real networks and create incentives for performance improvement. We analyse data from 138 network concession holders between 2000 and 2007. The results show that norm models are not adequate representations of real networks. Also, utilities that perform better than their norm models tend to behave opportunistically. Finally, we find that private utilities respond more strongly to incentives.     

Regime-switching and interest rates in the European monetary system

This paper examines the impact that a currency target zone has on short-term interest rates. For a number of countries in the European Monetary System, we characterize the short rate using a regime-switching model that allows for a differently parameterized mean-reverting square-root process in each regime. We find that the volatility, the level, and the speed-of-adjustment are all higher in the regime that is operative during speculative attacks and currency crises. Moreover, we allow the conditional probability of being in each regime to be state-dependent so the model can be used to examine questions relating to the likelihood of realignments and the stability of the target zone system.     

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

When it comes to the crunch: What are the drivers of the US banking crisis?

This article considers how permissive regulatory conditions helped change the size and scope of the US mortgage market. Asset backed securitization facilitated an expansion of the US mortgage market and modified the structure of the value chain within which financial assets, risk and liquidity were managed. New sophisticated mortgage products, indulgent lending practices, loose credit assessment and flimsy documentation increased the probability of mortgage default in an economic downturn. US banks were not in a position to absorb mark-to-market losses on mortgage assets and goodwill impairment resulting from a credit crunch because they operate with narrow profit margins and a limited equity cushion in the balance sheet. This article questions the viability and sustainability of this banking business model.     

Creative Destruction, Investment Volatility, and the Average Age of Capital

In this article, a new numerical procedure is used to compute the equilibrium of a vintage capital growth model with nonlinear utility, where the scrapping time is nonconstant. We show that equilibrium investment and output converge nonmonotonically to the balanced growth path due to replacement echoes. We find that the average age of capital is inversely related to output, which is consistent with recent micro evidence reinforcing the importance of the embodied question. We also find that an unanticipated permanent increase in the rate of embodied technological progress causes labor productivity to slowdown in the short run.     

Doing Unto Others: The Reciprocity of Helping Behavior in Organizations

Reciprocity is a fundamental aspect of social life, and a phenomenon studied from a wide variety of philosophical, theological, and social scientific perspectives. In this study, we use social exchange theory to investigate why employees help other employees. We hypothesize, based on the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), that a significant cause of an employee's helping behavior is how much organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) the employee has received from coworkers. To provide evidence of the discriminant validity of OCB received as an antecedent of helping behavior, we also assess its effects on another form of extra-role behavior, voice, as well as in-role performance. We found, in a sample of 157 employee-supervisor dyads, that OCB received was related to helping behavior after controlling for several antecedents of helping behavior identified in past research, and was less related to voice and in-role behavior, as hypothesized. Implications for theory and practice are presented.     

William J. Baumol: An Entrepreneurial Economist on the Economics of Entrepreneurship

William J. Baumol is the 2003 winner of the International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research. Throughout his career Baumol has urged the profession to pay attention to the instrumental role of entrepreneurship in economic renewal and growth. At the same time he has insisted that economists continue to use their usual tool box when the purview of analysis is extended to entrepreneurship. Hence, Baumol can be characterized as a revolutionary from within. In this article we present and discuss Baumol's research contribution in the areas of entrepreneurship and small business economics, notably from a growth perspective. In addition to placing his work in these areas into the wider context of his full contribution, we emphasize Baumol's findings that growth cannot be explained by the accumulation of various factors of production per se; human creativity and productive entrepreneurship are needed to combine the inputs in profitable ways. As a result, an institutional environment that encourages productive entrepreneurship and human experimentation becomes the ultimate determinant of economic growth.