Are Gay Men and Lesbians Discriminated against in the Hiring Process?

This article presents the first field experiment on sexual orientation discrimination in the hiring process in the Swedish labor market. Job applications were sent to about 4000 employers in 10 different occupations in Sweden. Gender and sexual orientation were randomly assigned to applications. The results show that sexual orientation discrimination exists in the Swedish labor market. The discrimination against the gay male applicant and the lesbian applicant varied across different occupations and appears to be concentrated in the private sector. The results also show that the gay male applicant was discriminated against in typical male‐dominated occupations, whereas the lesbian applicant was discriminated against in typical female‐dominated occupations. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Eliciting Willingness to Pay without Bias using Follow-up Certainty Statements: Comparisons between Probably/Definitely and a 10-point Certainty Scale

Correction for hypothetical bias using follow up certainty questions often takes one of two forms: (1) two options, “definitely sure” and “probably sure”, or (2) a 10-point scale with 10 very certain. While both have been successful in eliminating hypothetical bias from estimates of WTP by calibrating based on the certainty of yes responses, little is known about the relationship between the two. The purpose of this paper is to compare the two using data from three field experiments in a private good, dichotomous choice format. We compare four types of yes responses that differ in the criterion used to determine if there is sufficient certainty for a hypothetical yes response to be considered a true yes response. We make several comparisons, but focus on determining which values on the 10-point scale give the same estimates of WTP as “definitely sure” hypothetical yeses and real yeses (actual purchases). Values that produce equivalence are near 10 on the certainty scale.     

Latina entrepreneurship

We utilize individual panel data from the 1996 and 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to analyze the relative success of self-employed female Hispanics. To allow for a meaningful comparison of earnings between self-employed and wage/salary women, we generate different earnings measures addressing the role of business equity. We compare earnings of Hispanic female entrepreneurs to both Latina wage/salary workers and to self-employed female non-Hispanic whites. Latina entrepreneurs are observed to have lower mean earnings than both white female entrepreneurs and Latina employees. However, our findings indicate that Latina entrepreneurs often do well, once differences in mean observable characteristics, such as education, are taken into account. Self-employed Latinas are estimated to earn more than observationally similar non-minority white female entrepreneurs and slightly less than observationally similar wage/salary-employed Latinas.     

Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

A simple principal-agent model with bilateral asymmetric information and common values is developed. The agent(s) has private information about his characteristics but does not knowhow these affect outcomes. The principal knows how the characteristics translate into outcomes, but does not observe the characteristics. It is shown that equilibrium contracts aresimple in being designednot to reveal the agent's characteristics. When the agent knows howsome of his characteristics affect the outcome, contracts will be differentiated with respect to precisely those characteristics. An application to the use of genetic information is considered.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A REJOINDER

In our 2011 survey of the literature in the Journal of Economic Surveys on the effect of government size on economic growth in wealthy countries we find a relatively consistent pattern: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5–1 percentage point lower annual growth rate. This conclusion is questioned by Colombier. In this rejoinder we present a rebuttal of Colombier's argument based on a detailed scrutiny of his own statistical evidence and regression results. Furthermore, we note that several new papers that have appeared since our original paper was published give support to our main conclusion.     

Extraordinary politics and durable reform: lessons from trade liberalisation in Estonia and Poland

This article analyses the significance of the period of extraordinary politics after the fall of communism for policy reform. It examines under what circumstances policy reforms enacted during such periods are durable by comparing trade liberalisation in Poland and Estonia in the early 1990s. The article relates this question to the historical institutionalist debate surrounding critical junctures, gradual change and the politics of stability and change. It argues that trade policy reform enacted during periods of extraordinary politics is most likely to be durable if it is associated with deeper changes in structural conditions, such as dominant ideas, interests and institutions.     

The use and development of indicators for the commercialisation of university research in a national support programme

Governments in most countries have set up specialised programmes to support the commercialisation of academic research. A key challenge is to develop indicators that are able to measure operation and impact. This study shows how different indicators are used to satisfy different stakeholders of a Norwegian support programme. Policy intervention is supposed to lead to additionality related to input, behaviour and output. While the support programme uses input and behavioural measures as strategic tools for its operation, policy makers are mostly preoccupied with output measures. This study illustrates how indicators develop over time, partly co-evolving with the development of the programme and the national commercialisation infrastructure. Indicators serve as incentives for the agents involved, but they may also influence the strategies of the programme that established them. The external signalling effect of indicators remains central, while its use in daily operations becomes less important with time and experience.