Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games

Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. With a few exceptions, these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In three large experiments, we investigate whether social framing effects are also present in Dictator games. Since only one of the subjects makes a decision, the frame can affect behavior merely through preferences. In all the experiments, we find that behavior is insensitive to social framing. We discuss how to reconcile the absence of social framing effects in Dictator games with the presence of social framing effects in Ultimatum games.     

Adoption of enterprise systems and radio frequency identification among service firms

A promising technology for optimizing supply-chain processes is radio frequency identification (RFID). By adding functionality to previous enterprise systems, the aim is to increase transparency of information throughout the supply chain. In this paper, we present a survey of RFID implementation in Swedish service firms. The findings show that although the great majority of firms are actively working with integrated information systems, only a very small fraction have adopted RFID.     

Which News Moves the Euro Area Bond Market?

Abstract. This paper explores a long dataset (1999–2005) of intraday prices on German long-term bond futures and examines market responses to major macroeconomic announcements and ECB monetary policy releases. German bond markets tend to react more strongly to the surprise component in US macro releases compared with aggregated and national euro area and UK releases, and the strength of those reactions to US releases has increased over the period considered. We also document that the numbers of German unemployed workers consistently have been known to investors before official releases.     

What is at Stake in the Doha Round?

In this study the key elements of the WTO Doha Round are simulated and the main implications for international trade and national income are analysed. Based on negotiation information, three scenarios are designed. All scenarios encompass goods, services and agricultural liberalisation as well as trade facilitation. For goods liberalisation, a so‐called Swiss formula is used to cut bound tariff rates. Agricultural tariffs are cut according to a tiered linear formula. Attention has been given to the modelling of trade facilitation. Indirect as well as direct trade transaction costs are modelled. For simulation of the services liberalisation quantitative estimates of indirect trade barriers are used. The simulation results show that all regions in the aggregation gain in the simulated Doha scenarios, with a particularly strong result for developing countries. A conservative estimate is that global income increases with 0.2–0.7 per cent of initial GDP, depending on the level of liberalisation. Trade facilitation contributes the most to these results, with increased market access for non‐agricultural goods coming in second place. Overall, simulations indicate the importance of countries’ own liberalisation for their national income gains, and the importance of a broad‐based round.     

How to design and use the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol? A developing country perspective

Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries committed to emission reductions may fullfil part of their obligations by implementing emission reduction projects in developing countries. In doing so, they make use of the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Two important issues surround the implementation of the CDM. First, if the cheapest abatement measures are implemented for CDM projects, developing countries may be left with only more expensive measures when they have to meet their own commitments in the future (the so-called low-hanging fruits (LHF) issue). Second, a choice must be made on the type of baseline against which emission reductions are measured: an absolute baseline or a relative (to output) one (the baseline issue). The purpose of this paper is to study the interactions between these two issues from the point of view of the developing country. Two major results are obtained. First, when possible future commitments for developing countries and irreversibility of abatement measures are taken into account, we show that the industry where CDM projects are implemented enjoys larger profits under an absolute baseline than under a relative one. Second, concerning the LHF problem, the financial compensation required by the developing country for implementing ‘too many’ CDM projects is larger under the relative baseline.     

Cumulative culture and explosive demographic transitions

A demographic transition is a change in the pattern of growth of a population. Human history records several kinds of such transitions, e.g., from stability to growth or between different kinds of growth. Culture is often implied as the main fuel of demographic transitions, but theorizing is so far limited to verbal arguments. Here we study two simple formal models in which population size and the amount of culture in a population influence each other’s dynamics. The first model has two regimes: an equilibrium regime in which both population size and amount of culture reach stable values, and an explosive regime in which both variables increase exponentially without bound. A transition between these regimes is caused by changes in parameters that describe the accuracy of cultural transmission and the interaction between demography and culture. The second model suggests that a transition from extensive to intensive accumulation of culture may derive from a qualitative change in how individuals cooperate to create culture.     

Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining

We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent, the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded, sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less aggressively than under complete information, giving rise to disagreement and/or underinvestment. Our experiment support these predictions.     

GATT and the new economic order

The developing countries are calling for a “New Economic Order” because they feel that the trading system discriminates against them. Whether GATT will emerge from the present negotiations better adapted to the needs of the Third World remains to be seen.     

Optimal Policy with Tradable and Bankable Pollution Permits: Taking the Market Microstructure into Account

This paper analyzes how the way emission permits are traded—their market microstructure—affects the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets. Market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by setting an ask price and a bid price. The possibility of bank permits is also introduced in our dynamic two‐period model. We consider two models whether the market makers are perfectly informed about the technology of the producers or not. When the market makers have complete information, the equilibrium price of permits is the same as if the market is walrasian. When they are imperfectly informed, they may set a positive spread between bid and ask permit prices, which creates some inefficiency as the marginal abatement costs of polluters do not equalize. By allowing more flexibility in the use of the permits, banking may reduce the spread. Moreover, it may introduce price rigidities due to intertemporal arbitrage. In this framework, the circumstances under which banking should be allowed or not depend crucially on the evolution of the marginal willingness to pay for the environment.