Family firm disclosure and accounting regulation reform in the Middle East: The case of Jordan

We examine the quality of accounting disclosures by family firms using mandatory and voluntary disclosures as proxies for the quality of disclosure. We find that family firms comply more fully with mandatory disclosure requirements than do non-family firms but they disclose significantly less voluntary information. We also document that the enhanced accounting regulation improves the strength of the association between family ownership and mandatory disclosure compliance. Another important finding is the greater disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary, for firms with high family ownership compared to firms with low family ownership.     

Globalization discourses and performance measurement systems in a multinational firm

This paper examines the role of management control systems, in particular performance measurement systems (PMSs) such as the Balanced Scorecard and key performance indicators, in a multinational context. We begin by exploring how globalization discourses are engaged with, consumed, appropriated, re-produced, disseminated and promoted in a major multinational company. We link the adaptation and dissemination of global discourses of senior managers with Said’s (1975/1997) concepts of authority and molestation. We then examine how PMS are translated and customized within local manufacturing plants and sales units in the UK and China, the significance of benchmarking and the extent to which PMS render managerial discourses of globalization practical. We comment on the importance of discourse in understanding control systems in general and the way in which external discourses impact the internal practices of the organization. We also explore some of the sources that give rise to molestation (deviation of practice from global aspirations of senior managers). We conclude by stressing the potential for the globalizing effects of PMS through the interaction of the discourses of HQ and subunits, even in the absence of explicit statements about globalization.     

Leverage,executive incentives and corporate governance

This paper analyses the effect of executive incentives and internal governance on capital structure. Using a large sample of non‐financial US‐listed firms over the period 1999–2005, it is found that managers have different attitudes towards leverage when offered different incentive schemes; leverage initially decreases in bonuses and stock incentives and then increases in these incentives after a certain incentive level, suggesting the existence of the entrenchment–alignment effects under these incentive schemes. In contrast, leverage initially increases in option incentives and then decreases after a certain option incentive level. When all of these incentive schemes are combined together into a single incentive package, the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail. It is also found that leverage increases in internal governance and managers behave differently under different governance regimes such that the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail under weak governance firms, whereas the alignment–entrenchment effects prevail under strong governance firms. The results also suggest that managers’ target leverage ratio is less than the one predicted by theory or preferred by firm shareholders.     

On bank privatization: The case of Egypt

This paper discusses the controversy regarding the privatization of the banking sector in Egypt. It provides an overview of the structure and evolution of the banking system, in the context of the series of reform measures undertaken by the Egyptian authorities over the past decades. The paper assesses the performance of the state-owned banks versus private banks over the period 1995–2005. Microprudential indicators, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and profitability, reveal that state-owned banks lag behind in terms of efficiency and performance, compared to their private counterparts. Results also suggest that retaining government ownership can adversely affect banks performance. The paper explores the factors hindering the smooth implementation of bank privatization. The authors indicate that the financial sector reform currently adopted is comprehensive; however it is confronted with various political, social, and economic risks, which raise concerns regarding its sustainability. The paper then draws on the existing literature to provide guidance to policy makers, regarding effective and successful implementation of bank privatization.     

Political ideology and accounting regulation in China

This paper analyzes the relationship between political ideology and accounting change covering the transition from Maoism to Dengism in China. Under Mao, the ideological principles of class struggle primacy, central planning, and public ownership were mobilized to construct a class view of accounting according to which Western accounting concepts were prohibited because they were considered a tool of capitalist exploitation. Under Deng, the new ideological principles of economic development primacy, marketization, and mixed-ownership paved the way for a different view of accounting to emerge. Accounting was re-presented as a science and a neutral technology with no national boundaries, and the adoption of what were deemed Western accounting concepts, such as conservatism, was encouraged. In both eras, accounting was construed as a malleable object shaped by the force of the dominant political discourse. We show how in each era political ideology created a context that was rendered more or less compatible with the adoption of particular accounting concepts.     

DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES FOR QUOTED UK COMPANIES

This study reports further evidence as to the determinants of the audit fees paid by quoted companies in the UK. It outlines a framework based on the findings from semi-structured interviews with partners in four large audit firms and the results of previous research, and tests this framework by means of multivariate analysis using 1987 data for a large sample of quoted UK companies. A model explaining 87 per cent of the variation in audit fees is constructed. The principal explanatory variables are found to be auditee size, return on shareholders equity, the number of subsidiaries, the lag between the year end and the date of the audit report, the size of the auditor, a measure of auditee diversification, the ownership structure of the auditee, and whether the auditor was based in London, with the last three being new variables introduced in this study.