Setting an exam as an information design problem

We take a teacher's exam-setting task as an information design problem. Specifically, the teacher chooses a conditional distribution of grades given students' types. After observing their exam results, each student updates her belief regarding her type via Bayes' rule and chooses an action. Students' reactions to the same exam result could be different, depending on their heterogeneous prior beliefs. The teacher's objective is to persuade students to take a certain action (e.g., applying to universities), which some may not choose without an exam. The teacher adopts different grade distributions, depending on the teacher's and the students' heterogeneous prior beliefs.     

Ergodic chaos for non‐expansive economic models**

Ergodic chaos is one of the most important concepts in the theory of nonlinear economics. Due to the lack of appropriate sufficient conditions, its reach has not been fully understood. In this paper a sufficient condition for ergodic chaos that covers non‐expansive dynamical systems is examined. By analyzing an endogenous growth model as an example, we discuss the breadth of models in which ergodic chaos can emerge.     

The turnpike of dynamic general equilibrium paths and its insensitivity to initial conditions

Asymptotic turnpike theorems in the case where the future is discounted are traditionally derived under the assumptions that a utility function is twice differentiable and that is Hessian is negative definite. Replacing these assumptions by a weaker one. I give a proof of the theorem simpler than existing ones.     

Long-run matching relationship in the Japanese labor market

This paper investigates the long-run relationship among new hiring, unemployment (job seekers), and unfilled vacancies in Japan, using an annual panel data on 47 prefectures for 1972-1999. We find that these three variables are I(1) processes, and are cointegrated in our panel data. Further, we estimate the panel cointegration equation derived from a Cobb-Douglas matching function by the heterogeneous fully modified OLS and heterogeneous dynamic OLS. The estimation results reveal that conventional within estimates could have non-negligible biases.First version received: November 2002/Final version received: October 2003All correspondence to Shigeki Kano. The authors are grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments. Doctor Stephen J. Turnbull (University of Tsukuba) is also acknowledged for correcting English errors in this paper. Remaining errors are due to the authors. The data set and GAUSS programming code used in this paperare available upon request.     

Identifying the sources of energy use change: Multiple calibration decomposition analysis and structural decomposition analysis

Decomposition methodologies are requisite to identify the sources of changes in energy use or carbon dioxide emissions. This paper is an inquiry into the theoretical properties of such decomposition methodologies. The study first presents our new decomposition methodology – the Multiple Calibration Decomposition Analysis (MCDA) – as a tool for the investigation. Then, it theoretically reexamines an established decomposition methodology – the Structural Decomposition Analysis proposed by Casler and Rose (1998). Subsequently, the study empirically investigates the properties of both methodologies, applying them to an actual case: the changes in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in Japan during the oil crises period, when the oil price had a significant influence on the economy. The result shows that understanding the theoretical properties of decomposition methodologies is essential for a precise interpretation of empirical results.     

Market Size and Firm Location in a Service Industry

This paper investigates the welfare effects of firm location in a service industry. We consider the situation where firms determine their locations in either of two regions with a difference in market size. From the viewpoint of the consumers' welfare, there are too few firms in the large market and too many in the small market. However, from the viewpoint of the producers' and social welfare, the opposite is true. Further, an increase in the difference in market size is unambiguously unfavorable for the producers. On the other hand, such an increase is favorable for the consumers and the economy as a whole.     

Trade and Gains from Trade Between Profit-maximizing and Labour-managed Countries with Imperfect Competition

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade.     

Bank risk and non-interest income activities in the Indonesian banking industry

The recent trend of product diversification in the Indonesian banking industry underscores the importance of non-interest income activities. This study examines the relationship between product diversification and bank risk over the period of 2002–2008. Our analysis shows clear evidence that the effect of product diversification on bank risk depends highly on the bank's asset size. Specifically, the degree of product diversification is negatively associated with bank risk for small-sized banks. Conversely, the degree of product diversification is positively related to bank risk for large-sized banks. This finding suggests that deregulation encouraging banks to become more involved in non-traditional activities may have an adverse effect on the overall banking system where large-sized banks are playing a significant role in Indonesia.     

Corruption,market quality,and entry deterrence in emerging economies

In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India.