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11.
This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country. 相似文献
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Jean-Michel Grandmont Kazuo Nishimura Makoto Yano 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2008,4(2):137-149
Professor Takashi Negishi has made fundamental contributions to economic theory on an extremely broad range of topics. As the editors of this special issue, we feel extremely fortunate that each of us has worked on topics with respect to which Professor Negishi's influences have been particularly large. In this introductory article, each of us will discuss Professor Negishi's influence on the topic we are most familiar with. For the entire spectrum of his research, readers are referred to the list of Professor Negishi's publications presented at the end of this article. 相似文献
14.
In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India. 相似文献
15.
Makoto Matsuo 《International Journal of Human Resource Management》2020,31(5):638-656
AbstractThe main goal of this study was to investigate the effects of managers’ exploration activities on learning orientation, reflection, and unlearning of team members. A questionnaire survey was conducted among 115 employees in 23 teams from a Japanese pharmaceutical company. The results of multi-level analyses suggest that managers’ exploration activities had a direct influence on team members’ learning orientations, which subsequently had a positive influence on their unlearning, with and without the mediation of reflection. These findings suggest that a subordinate’s unlearning is driven by managers’ activities through motivational and cognitive processes. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. 相似文献
16.
The authors build a trade model that renders tractable the process in which imperfect competition in a country's downstream sector affects the rest of the world through international trade. For this purpose, internationally traded goods are viewed as middle products in the vertical chain of production, in which middle products are produced upstream and transformed into final consumption goods downstream. Suppression of competition in a country's downstream sector may serve as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy, increasing that country's own utility while reducing that of its trading partner countries. 相似文献
17.
The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb–Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor. 相似文献
18.
Tsuyoshi Shinozaki Makoto Tawada Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara 《Review of International Economics》2019,27(3):765-785
We investigate the effects of a public intermediate good on trade patterns, capital accumulation, and the gains from trade in a two‐country, three‐sector overlapping generations model. A public intermediate good affects not only the productivity of private production but capital accumulation; thus, the results differ from those obtained in previous studies. First, opening to trade may accelerate capital accumulation in the higher‐savings country. Additionally, the country producing a public intermediate good more (which is labor‐intensive) may be the importer of the investment good (which is the most capital‐intensive). Finally, the lower‐savings country may have lower steady‐state welfare under trade. 相似文献
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This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade. 相似文献