A revised model of experiential learning with a debriefing checklist

Although Kolb’s experiential learning model has been widely used and remains among the most influential frameworks in the fields of human resource development, management education and higher education, it has been criticized for failing to propose a second‐order learning process. The purpose of this study was to revise Kolb’s model by addressing its limitations. The revised model consists of (1) expected and unexpected experiences, (2) the management of emotions, (3) reflective analysis, (4) abstract conceptualization, (5) unlearning, and (6) active experimentation. Developed from the revised model, we created a checklist for debriefing experience‐based training programs. The contribution of this study is its development of a framework and a checklist for deep experiential learning.     

Incomplete Insurance and Non-expected Utility

This paper shows that the estimation of non-expected utility (Kreps–Porteus preference) based on the representative agent model is less robust with respect to the departure from complete markets than is the expected utility for the following reasons. First, the precautionary saving caused by uninsured shocks may be evaluated incorrectly. Second, the portfolio held by individual household includes not only marketable assets, but also non-marketable assets (e.g. human capital) in the context of incomplete markets. Third, returns on marketable assets may not provide sufficient information for recovering relevant parameters. The estimated parameters available from the existing empirical research are consistent with the biasedness of parameters implied by this study.
JEL Classification: E44, G12.     

The primal route to the turnpike and asymptotic stability

Asymptotic turnpike theorems in the case where the future is discounted are traditionally derived under the assumptions that a utility function is twice differentiable and that is Hessian is negative definite. Replacing these assumptions by a weaker one. I give a proof of the theorem simpler than existing ones.     

Destabilization effect of international trade in a perfect foresight dynamic general equilibrium model

In the present paper, we consider a two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with CIES nonlinear preferences, asymmetric technologies across countries and decreasing returns to scale. It is shown that aggregate instability and endogenous fluctuations may occur due to international trade. In particular, we prove that the integration into a common market on which countries trade the produced good and the capital input may lead to period-two cycles even when the closed-economy equilibrium is saddle-point stable in both countries.     

人民币和中国经济

中国存在着许多结构性问题,如社会保障制度不健全,金融体制不完善等.这些问题的根源都不在汇率制度.要在根本上解决问题,在实行人民币升值和改革人民币汇率制度,提高汇率制度灵活性的同时,还要抑制投资过热,控制银行贷款规模,发展银行存款以外的股票、债券等资本市场,推进国有企业改革,实施消除将来不安的社会保障政策,实现利率自由化,改革金融体制等.只有使这些政策措施互相配合,很好地联动,才能取得卓越的成效.     

Competing to Outsource in the South

This paper analyzes foreign direct investment (FDI) competition in a three‐country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing in a developing country. The host‐country government endogenizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are negotiated. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinationals, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) oligopolistic rivalry; (b) quid pro quo FDI; (c) strategic outsourcing—FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host‐country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host‐country wage is sufficiently high, the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions, as well as the host country.     

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.     

Jumps in foreign exchange rates and stochastic unwinding of carry trades

Tails in the distribution of JPY/USD exchange rate returns are well approximated by an exponentially dampened power-law. Distribution parameter estimates indicate that yen appreciation jumps belong to a Levy process with unbounded variation, suggesting that same mechanism may be responsible for fluctuations in normal times as well as rare crashes. In contrast, yen depreciation jumps have a well defined second moment suggesting a Gaussian regime. In addition, extreme episodes of yen appreciation are larger and more persistent than episodes of yen depreciation. The asymmetry is magnified and power-law tails are more elongated during times of higher interest rate differential between U.S. and Japan and higher level of VIX indicating that carry trade may be the driver. We propose a model of strategic carry trader behavior that in equilibrium generates exponentially dampened power-law distribution of jumps in foreign exchange along with “up by the stairs down by the elevator” dynamics arising from the assymetries between negative and positive jumps.     

THE MARKET SELECTS THE WRONG FIRMS IN THE LONG RUN*

We consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially, only one type (in almost all cases) can survive in the long run. Free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium, in which the excess entry theorem holds. Further, we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy. In cases of either (i) a concave demand (which implies strategic substitutability) or (ii) strategic complementarity (which implies a convex demand), the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run. The market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run.