COLLUSION,FLUCTUATING DEMAND,AND PRICE RIGIDITY*

We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, all information but the private signals becomes public. We consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) mainly for patient firms. We show that price rigidity arises in the optimal SPPE if the accuracy of the private signals is low. We also study the implications of more firms and firms' impatience on collusive pricing.     

Network externalities, discrete demand shifts, and submarginal‐cost pricing

Abstract.  The introduction of a new product often causes a massive (discrete) demand shift to the new product. This study demonstrates that if a large‐scale demand shift to a new product is accompanied by network externalities, it may result in 'submarginal‐cost pricing,' by which the seller sets its price below the marginal cost. This finding casts new light on dumping and safeguard issues in the real world. JEL classification: D42     

Special Quotes Invoke Autocorrelation in Japanese Stock Prices*

It is reported in the present paper that 1‐min returns on TOPIX have exhibited significant autocorrelation at 5‐min intervals since 1997/1998. Special quotes that are issued whenever there is a price jump in excess of a predetermined band seem to be the source of this autocorrelation, because these have been automatically updated at 5‐min intervals since August 1998 and have appeared during the first 30 min from opening. Individual stock returns also exhibit fifth‐order autocorrelation, but this disappears when the data with special quotes are excluded from the sample. Therefore, the autocorrelation is caused by the special quotes: a type of market microstructure noise.     

Urban Pollution,Unemployment and National Welfare in a Dualistic Economy

This paper undertakes a comparative static analysis in the Harris–Todaro (H–T) model by accommodating local pollution. Unlike in the classical H–T model where migration proceeds in response to urban–rural differences in expected earnings, we consider labor movement taking place according to the difference in utility, which is influenced by the quality of the local environment. The paradoxical result is that an improvement in pollution‐abatement technology gives rise to an increase in urban unemployment and has no effect on the workers' aggregate welfare.     

新兴市场区位特定优势所带来的超额利润问题探析——服务业和分销业案例

地域优势带来的额外利润问题不仅限于制造业。近年来,跨国公司陆续将服务型和销售型子公司转移至相对低成本的新兴市场,产生了与制造业转移同样的转让定价反避税挑战。在不同的转让定价方法下,处理该类型公司的地域优势问题遇到的挑战有所不同。面对这些挑战,纳税人和税务当局都必须通过客观而严密的经济学分析进行探讨,方能得出一个各方满意的解决方案。     

On the Effects of Commodity Tax Under Free Entry Oligopoly in the Presence of Export Market

If the inverse demand function in the domestic country is concave, or it is not too convex even if it is convex, a small specific commodity tax raises the social welfare in the domestic country and lowers the welfare of the foreign consumers, and the optim- al tax for the domestic country is positive. The presence of an export market enlarges the possibility that a specific commodity tax raises the social welfare in the domestic country at the sacrifice of the welfare of the foreign consumers. [L13]     

A TWO FACTOR MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS

This paper analyzes empirical income distributions and proposes a simple stochastic model to explain the stationary distribution and deviations from it. Using the individual tax returns data in the U.S. and Japan for 40 years, we first summarize the shape of the income distribution by an exponential decay up to about the 90th percentile and a power decay for the top 1 percent. We then propose a minimal stochastic process of labor and asset income to reproduce the empirical characteristics. In particular, the Pareto exponent is derived analytically and matched with empirical statistics.     

Location choice,competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets, non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country, depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint.     

From hierarchy to hybrid: The evolving nature of inter-firm governance in China's automobile groups

Despite the rapid growth of automobile industry in China, much remains to be known about the governance structure especially the inter-firm relationship within the Chinese automobile groups. Against China's changing institutional environment and compared to the established knowledge on automobile group governance in Japan, this study provides a case analysis of the evolving nature of inter-firm relationship in one of China's major automobile groups, Tianjin Automotive Group (TAG). A top-down hierarchical administration characterizes the inter-firm relationship in TAG before 1999 due to the heavy influence of the old institutional arrangement. Over time, especially entering 2000, weakening institutional ties between the state and TAG forced the group to be more responsive to market changes and to systematically learn Japanese-style supplier management from a joint venture with Toyota Group. The paper provides rare insights into the evolution of governance structure among the emerging Chinese automobile groups and extends the institution-based view of strategy into the studies of inter-firm relationship in automobile industry.     

Testing the incentive effects in tournaments with a superstar

This paper studies the effects of the levels and the structure of prizes on the efforts of agents with heterogeneous ability in a tournament model. In particular, we examine how the presence of a highly able agent affects the effort levels of other agents as well as the effects of the total and the marginal prizes. Using panel data from the Japan Golf Tour, we estimate the effects of the presence of a superstar, and the size of the total and marginal prizes on the scores of professional golfers. We find that the presence of a superstar adversely affects the scores of the other players; that the larger the size of the total prize, the better are the scores; and that the larger the marginal prizes that players face at the end of the third round, the better the scores they achieve in the final round.