Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.     

Structural reform of the electricity industry and economic growth

Using 782 panel data from 34 OECD countries from 1991 to 2013, this study aims to evaluate how structural reform affects GDP growth rate. We use the Barro-type GDP growth rate regression model and apply both fixed and random effect models. Eight structural reform variables are selected: (i) third party access, (ii) wholesale market dummy, (iii) choice of supplier, (iv) private ownership, (v) generation-others separation, (vi) transmission-others separation, (vii) distribution-others separation and (viii) overall vertical separation. Major finding results are as follows: (i) third party access can positively contribute to GDP growth rate, (ii) wholesale market and overall vertical separation might have a small negative effect, and (iii) other variables have no significant effect.     

Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

Trait perceptions influence economic out-group bias: lab and field evidence from Vietnam

Group favoritism is typically directed toward in-group members and against out-group members, but these cross-group effects often vary. Little is known about why group effects on economic choices vary. We use a survey method developed in social psychology to measure stereotyped attitudes of one group toward another. These attitudes are then associated with prosociality in five experimental games (also using an unusual amount of individual-level sociodemographic control). We present evidence from an artificial field experiment of a majority group with high status (Vietnamese) exhibiting no disfavoritism toward a lower-status out-group (Khmer) and typical disfavoritism to a second out-group (Chinese). Both Vietnamese and Chinese groups see the Khmer as warm but incompetent, attitudes which seem to activate empathy rather than contempt. The results suggest that measuring between-group stereotype attitudes can be used to predict the sign of cross-group favoritism in other natural settings.     

International migration,foreign direct investment,and development stage in developing economies

The existing empirical results on the relationship between FDI and migration are rather mixed. This study reevaluates, both theoretically and empirically, how inward FDI relates to emigration in developing countries. Our model illustrates that the relationship between inward FDI and emigration flows depends on the development stage of a developing country, that is, there is a positive association between inward FDI and emigration flows for relatively less‐developed countries but a negative association between these two variables for relatively developed countries. We confirm the empirical validity of our model prediction using the panel data of 21 OECD and 51 non‐OECD countries during the period from 2003 to 2012. Our results argue that as economic development proceeds in a developing country, the home effect of inward FDI associated with intensified labor demand would dominate the linkage effect that induces the brain drain problem through enhancing the socioeconomic ties with migrant networks.     

Transitional dynamics of the R&D growth model with public education

This study analyzes the transition dynamics of the R&D-based growth model with public education, based on [Prettner, K. (2014). The non-monotonous impact of population growth on economic prosperity. Economics Letters, 124, 93–95]. We show that the equilibrium path can be monotonous or oscillatory, but may not converge depending on the value of parameters. Thus, we determine and indicate the sufficient condition for long-run oscillation to emerge. In addition, we find that the technological progress rate speeds up during the long-run balanced growth path when income tax rates for public education rise. This result is consistent with empirical analysis.     

Trade imbalances and harmonization of competition policies

The present study constructs a game in which the two countries strategically set competition policies in their respective non-tradable service sectors. These policies affect the countries’ utilities through the presence of trade imbalances. We demonstrate that in the presence of persisting trade imbalances, in a Nash equilibrium, the trade-deficit country maintains perfect competition while the trade-surplus country restricts competition. This shows it highly difficult to harmonize their policies to achieve the first best state under the current international trade regime, which is centered around the principle of reciprocity.     

HISTORY‐DEPENDENT PATHS AND TRADE GAINS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH A PUBLIC INTERMEDIATE GOOD*

This study reexamines McMillan's (International Economic Review 19 (1978), 665–78) analysis of a dynamic small open economy with a public intermediate good. Concerning the trade patterns of the open economy, we find results that were overlooked in McMillan's analysis. Among others, if labor endowment is of intermediate size, there are two saddle‐point steady states, and the initial stock of the public good determines the long‐run trade pattern. We also add a gains‐from‐trade analysis to McMillan's model and demonstrate that if the economy has a comparative advantage in a good with productivity less sensitive to the public intermediate good, the economy may lose from trade at the steady state.     

Foreign Direct Investment, Human Capital and Environmental Pollution in China

By using provincial socioeconomic and environmental data, this paper examines the relationship between human capital, FDI and pollution emissions in China. The result shows the impact of FDI on pollution emission is highly dependent on the level of human capital. FDI is negatively associated with pollution emissions in provinces with the higher levels of human capital, whereas FDI is positively related to pollution emissions in provinces with the lower levels of human capital. This suggests that pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) holds only in those provinces with low human capital. This study also finds that the sign of FDI’s effect on each pollutant’ emission requires the different threshold level of human capital, which may help to reconcile the current conflicting PHH empirical evidences partially.     

Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the “virtual” revenue equivalence.