HOME EQUITY IN RETIREMENT

Retired homeowners dissave more slowly than renters, which suggests that homeownership affects retirees' saving decisions. We investigate empirically and theoretically the life-cycle patterns of homeownership, housing, and nonhousing assets in retirement. Using an estimated structural model of saving and housing decisions, we find first that homeowners dissave slowly because they prefer to stay in their house as long as possible but cannot easily borrow against it. Second, the 1996–2006 housing boom significantly increased homeowners' assets. These channels are quantitatively significant; without considering homeownership, retirees' net worth would be 28%–44% lower, depending on age.     

The determinants of employers’ use of temporary contracts in the frictional labor market

This paper focuses on the following two primary reasons that employers use temporary contracts: to flexibly adjust employment and to screen workers. A search-matching framework is used to not only address employers’ endogenous choices in using temporary contracts, but also numerically identify the situations in which these contracts are likely to be used as a screening tool for permanent positions. This numerical exercise demonstrates that reducing employment protections in permanent jobs, reducing benefits for unemployed workers and raising the conversion probability from temporary to permanent employment will increase the relative proportion of employers who use temporary contracts as a screening device.     

On Professor Takashi Negishi's contributions to economic theory

Professor Takashi Negishi has made fundamental contributions to economic theory on an extremely broad range of topics. As the editors of this special issue, we feel extremely fortunate that each of us has worked on topics with respect to which Professor Negishi's influences have been particularly large. In this introductory article, each of us will discuss Professor Negishi's influence on the topic we are most familiar with. For the entire spectrum of his research, readers are referred to the list of Professor Negishi's publications presented at the end of this article.     

The incentive for export subsidies under imperfect competition

By taking into account factor market interactions, the theory of strategic trade policies can consistently explain the fact that less efficient countries offer greater export subsidies to the most technologically advanced industries because in these countries there may be greater differences in efficiency of production technology between industries than in more efficient countries.     

Does agricultural trade liberalization increase risks of supply-side uncertainty?: Effects of productivity shocks and export restrictions on welfare and food supply in Japan

Agriculture is the focus of much contention in free trade negotiations. The Japanese government is against liberalizing the rice trade on the grounds that it would threaten “national food security” in the events of such shocks as crop failure and embargoes. Trade liberalization is expected to make the Japanese economy more dependent upon food imports and, thus, more susceptible to these risks. Using a computable general equilibrium model with a Monte Carlo simulation, we quantify the welfare impacts of productivity shocks and export quotas by major rice exporters to Japan and found little evidence of Japan suffering from such shocks.     

Effects of international sharing of pollution abatement burdens on income inequality among countries

Improvements in environmental quality will boost output production and hence economic growth. However, although environmental abatement equally benefits all economies in the world, it is shown that, if the private productive resources are not yet accumulated sufficiently in low income economies, income inequality among economies can be widened in the short term not only under equal burden sharing of pollution abatement but even under income-proportional burden sharing. When the marginal productivity is diminishing, the negative effect of the burden is large relative to the positive effect of the improved environment in economies in which resources are not accumulated sufficiently.     

The Substitution Effect of Mobile Games on Console Games: An Empirical Analysis of the Japanese Video Game Industry

In this paper, we discuss the substitution effects between mobile games and console games. We estimate such effects by a fixed-effect regression with instrumental variables using panel data of about 100,000 observations. The results showed that the substitution effects of playing smart devices on 3DS, Wii, and PSP were recognizable, but did not have significant effects on PS3, and the substitution effects on PSP were very small. Therefore, mobile games had a substitution effect on casual console games, or on console games in which the play situation resembled mobile games. In addition, the substitution effects were at most about 0.1. The substitution effects were small. Our results indicate that mobile games represent the pioneers in the new market of gaming at least during our observation period. But new games and traditional games will coexist for a while.     

Cooperative choice and its framing effect under threshold uncertainty in a provision point mechanism

This paper explores how threshold uncertainty affects cooperative behaviors in the provision of public goods and the prevention of public bads. The following facts motivate our study. First, environmental (resource) problems are either framed as public bads prevention or public goods provision. Second, the occurrence of these problems is characterized by thresholds that are interchangeably represented as “nonconvexity,” “bifurcation,” “bi-stability,” or “catastrophes.” Third, the threshold location is mostly unknown. We employ a provision point mechanism with threshold uncertainty and analyze the responses of cooperative behaviors to uncertainty and to the framing for each type of social preferences categorized by a value orientation test. We find that aggregate framing effects are negligible, although the response to the frame is the opposite depending on the type of social preferences. “Cooperative” subjects become more cooperative in negative frames than in positive frames, whereas “individualistic” subjects are less cooperative in negative frames than in positive ones. This finding implies that the insignificance of aggregate framing effects arises from behavioral asymmetry. We also find that the percentage of cooperative choices non-monotonically varies with the degree of threshold uncertainty, irrespective of framing and value orientation. Specifically, the degree of cooperation is highest at intermediate levels of threshold uncertainty and decreases as the uncertainty becomes sufficiently large.     

Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting

The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb–Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor.     

Trade and Gains from Trade Between Profit-maximizing and Labour-managed Countries with Imperfect Competition

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade.