MeasuringIncome and Measuring Sustainability

We examine what interpretation can be given to inclusive income , understood to be consumption plus the value of the net increase in all relevant capital stocks. We introduce the concept of instantaneously constant value income , defined as the maximum amount the economy can consume at a moment of time and keep the expected present value of utility of current and future generations constant. We argue that this income concept captures some of the concerns underlying sustainability. Our main result is that inclusive income equals instantaneously constant value income . We show that this result holds in a very general setting and, in particular, carries over to models incorporating technological progress when such progress can be captured by augmented stocks of knowledge. An important implication of our main result is that it provides a very simple method for deriving inclusive income, which does not involve any linearization of the Hamiltonian.     

The Challenge of Risk Reporting: Regulatory and Corporate Responses

Corporate collapses such as those of Ansett Australia, Centaur Mining, Enron, HIH and One. Tel have rekindled regulators' concerns about the lack of transparency in financial reporting on risks and uncertainties. This paper examines the broad conceptual issues and regulatory responses so far in leading jurisdictions and investigates risk reporting of Australian entities operating in the mining sector. The limited and uneven level of reporting on risk found, in this study, if replicated in other industries and jurisdictions, provides justification for standard-setters considering more explicit requirements than the existing piecemeal rules of restricted scope.     

Questions for Kaleckians: a response ∗

In the previous article Ian Steedman raises a range of issues in connection with the Kaleckian treatment of prices. In this article, I argue that many of the points raised are misplaced whilst others do make a positive contribution.     

Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength

The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

评估客户的信用风险

对任何企业的生存来说,保持健康的现金流都至关重要.但在当今恶劣的经济环境下,要管理来自债权人的现金流变得越来越困难.问题在于:每个债权人的信用风险程度都不相同,为了保护你的现金流,你必须了解客户拥有的不同信用风险水平,然后有效地管理那些风险.     

Unions,integration and society

An analysis of the role of trade unions in a democratic society and the problems of overcoming the general apathy of members leads the author to suggest ways of increasing participation in union activities.     

Indonesian economic development: Mirage or miracle?

This paper focuses on a few major developments that took place during the three decades from the late 1960s to the Asian financial crisis. The study finds, in retrospect, that many of the Indonesian economy’s weaknesses—now so glaringly apparent—were there all the time. The paper concludes that the Indonesian banking crisis was primarily domestic in nature, more so than the crises in Korea and Thailand. The extent of the failure was much more widespread and probably resulted from a chain of bank runs and bank closings, reinforced by uncertainty and lack of faith in the government’s commitment to the IMF program and IMF fumbling.