Modeling Drivers and Barriers of Artificial Intelligence Adoption: Insights from a Strategic Management Perspective

Artificial intelligence (AI) in business processes and academic research in AI has significantly increased. However, the adoption of AI in organizational strategy is yet to be explored in extant literature. This study proposes two conceptual frameworks showing hierarchical relationships among the various drivers and barriers to AI adoption in organizational strategy. In a two-step approach, the literature study is first done to identify eight drivers of and nine barriers to AI adoption and validated by academic and industry experts. In the second step, MICMAC (matrice d'impacts croises-multiplication appliqúe a un classment or cross-impact matrix multiplication applied to classification) analysis categorizes the drivers and barriers to AI adoption in organizational strategy. Total interpretive structural modeling (TISM) is developed to understand the complex and hierarchical associations among the drivers and barriers. This is the first attempt to model the drivers and barriers using a methodology like TISM, which provides a comprehensive conceptual framework with hierarchical relationships and relative importance of the drivers and barriers to AI adoption. AI solutions' decision-making ability and accuracy are the most influential drivers that influence other driving factors. Lack of an AI adoption strategy, lack of AI talent, and lack of leadership commitment are the most significant barriers that affect other barriers. Recommendations for senior leadership are discussed to focus on the leading drivers and barriers. Also, the limitations and future research scope are addressed.     

Entry liberalization and export performance: a theoretical analysis in a multi-market oligopoly model

This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how the entry (costless) of firms in an industry may have a dramatic effect on exports from an industry in a country. The results have tremendous implications for LDCs suffering from resource and BOP constraints but having reservoirs of cheap labor. The welfare effects of such entry liberalization policy (or subsidy) can be stated from the Bhagwati theorem that a reduction in an only (single) distortion is necessarily welfare improving by reducing monopoly or oligopoly distortions. However, we have shown that the entry liberalization policy is welfare superior to an equivalent subsidy policy where equivalent is defined in terms of the impact on exports. As a by product, we have also shown how one can integrate the oligopoly models of trade with the general oligopoly literature. The results on the limiting behaviour of an open economy oligopoly model extend the standard results in the oligopoly theory in a closed economy.