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82.
A pervasive empirical finding, widely known as the ‘flypaper effect’, is that lump-sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction. Moreover, such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process. We posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid. The empirical results are consistent with ‘flypaper’ and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants. 相似文献
83.
In many many places, the political parties and political contests seem to array themselves along a single dimension. If you look at their programs in detail it always turns out that it's much more complicated than that. But it would appear that in the minds of the voters they are literally frequently arrayed on a single continuum which, as a result of the organization of the French chamber of deputies, is usually referred to as a left/right. 相似文献
84.
Ilan Maoz 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》1983,4(4):395-410
Recently I proposed a general notion of equilibrium for n-person games which is based on mutual threats and promises (responses), and which leads, in general, to a determinate solution with respect to the order of choice moves. The nature of the solution set in our model is a function of the action sets, the payoff functions, and the cost of ‘communication and enforcement of agreements’ (C&E). The main concern of this paper is to show that the Cournot duopoly solution, for the case of a linear demand function facing two identical firms, can be regenerated by our solution concept under a certain assumption about a high cost C&E. On the other hand, it is shown that under a relatively low cost of C&E the Cournot/Nash solution does not belong to our solution set, because it is Pareto inferior for both duopolists relative to some solutions in our set, among them, the standard monopoly solution. 相似文献
85.