Information aggregation in experimental asset markets in the presence of a manipulator

We study with the help of a laboratory experiment the conditions under which an uninformed manipulator—a robot trader that unconditionally buys several shares of a common value asset in the beginning of a trading period and unwinds this position later on—is able to induce higher asset prices. We find that the average price is significantly higher in the presence of the manipulator if and only if the asset takes the lowest possible value and insiders receive perfect information about the true value of the asset. It is also evidenced that the robot trader makes trading gains. Finally, both uninformed and partially informed traders may suffer from the presence of the robot.     

The link between board composition and board objectives: an empirical analysis on Flemish non‐profit schools

Flemish non‐profit schools have no legally imposed composition rules with respect to their board of directors. Hence, large variation exists in their size and composition. We argue that these differences in board composition can result in different policies followed by the board. To empirically test this hypothesis we question the board's chairpersons of Flemish non‐profit schools about the objectives set forward by the board. Ordered probit regressions on the importance attached to different educational objectives provide support for our hypothesis and thus alert policy makers to account for the linkages between objectives and board characteristics when formulating legislation with respect to school board composition. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Migrants as second-class workers in urban China? A decomposition analysis

In urban China, urban resident annual earnings are 1.3 times larger than long-term rural migrant earnings as observed in a nationally representative sample in 2002. Using microsimulation, we decompose this difference into four sources, with particular attention to path-dependence and statistical distribution of the estimated effects: (1) different allocation to sectors that pay different wages (sectoral effect); (2) hourly wage disparities across the two populations within sectors (wage effect); (3) different working times within sectors (working time effect); and (4) different population structures (population effect). Although sector allocation is extremely contrasted, with very few migrants in the public sector and very few urban residents working as self-employed, this has no clear impact on earnings differentials, because the sectoral effect is not robust to the path followed for the decomposition. The second main finding is that the population effect is robust and significantly more important than wage or working time effects. This implies that the main source of disparity between the two populations is pre-market (education opportunities) rather than on-market.     

Consumer@Protection.EU. An Analysis of European Consumer Legislation in the Information Society

The Internet and electronic commerce have emerged as the emblems of a worldwide virtual economy. Although it is yet difficult to grasp all the repercussions of the borderless world of the Internet, it is certain that to shop in this world is different from shopping in the world as we knew it ten years ago. Obviously, the new developments affect the traditional framework of European and national consumer law and the perspectives that underpin this body of law, for most consumer law was established at a time when the Information Society was an unknown phenomenon. Underlining the importance of this issue, the European Council asked the Commission to examine existing consumer law in the Community in the light of the new conditions created by the Information Society and to identify potential problems and loopholes. A report on background research for this examination was submitted to the Commission in August 2000. The present article is based on this report and provides an account of the main findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report.     

Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements” can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient. Our setting is a bargaining game in which agreements form sequentially. The individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global agreement is always the socially optimal structure. There are two equilibrium outcomes, the global agreement and an asymmetric structure, which consists of two coalitions of different sizes, the small one free riding on the contributions of the larger one. We run an experiment which lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient. However, subjects do not play Nash and the experimental outcome is, on average, even more inefficient than the theory predicts. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that different types of behaviour co-exist.     

The value of delays: market- and policy-induced adjustment processes as a motivating factor in dynamic entrepreneurship

Reaching societal consensus on how to deal with new issues, e.g. agreeing on commercial law for e-commerce, takes time. Traditional economics has considered such anomalies as market imperfections. By contrast, this paper suggests perceiving such “delays” as windows of opportunity for entrepreneurs. These considerations from evolutionary economics and entrepreneurship will be explored in a case study on disease management services in Germany. It will become clear that detailed ex ante legal regulation restricts entrepreneurial room for variation. To avoid this loss of knowledge generation, the government should abstain from introducing such premature intervention without having to challenge existing meta-rules.     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.