Trade diversion under selective preferential market access

Abstract .  The European Community (EC) operates a multi-layered GSP scheme in which different groups of developing countries are granted varying degrees of market access. This paper analyzes the question of trade diversion among different categories of beneficiary countries ensuing from the selectivity of preferential market access. Evidence from a disaggregated panel data analysis reveals sizable intra-developing country trade diversion. The losses for relatively disadvantaged countries in terms of forgone trade volume are estimated to range between about 2% to 20% of their total trade with the EC. The distortions are driven by highly substitutable, mostly labour-intensive commodities.     

Doorsteps Toward Political and Economic Openness: Testing the North-Wallis-Weingast Transition Framework

In this paper, we test the theoretical framework developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), who posit that limited-access societies need to meet three doorstep conditions before they can transit into open-access societies: (1) establishment of rule of law among elites, (2) adoption of perpetually existing organizations, and (3) political control of the military. We identify indicators reflecting these doorsteps and econometrically test their relationships with specific political and economic variables. We broadly confirm the logic behind the doorsteps as necessary conditions in the transition to open-access societies. The doorsteps influence economic and political processes, as well as each other, with varying intensities.     

Giving Stated Preference Respondents “Time to Think”: Results From Four Countries

Previous studies have found that contingent valuation (CV) respondents who are given overnight to reflect on a CV scenario have 30–40% lower average willingness-to-pay (WTP) than respondents who are interviewed in a single session. This “time to think” (TTT) effect could explain much of the gap between real and hypothetical WTP observed in experimental studies. Yet giving time to think is still rare in binary or multinomial discrete choice studies. We review the literature on increasing survey respondents’ opportunities to reflect on their answers and synthesize results from parallel TTT studies on private vaccine demand in four countries. Across all four countries, we find robust and consistent evidence from both raw data and multivariate models for a TTT effect: giving respondents overnight to think reduced the probability that a respondent said he or she would buy the hypothetical vaccines. Average WTP fell approximately 40%. Respondents with time to think were also more certain of their answers, and a majority said they used the opportunity to consult with their spouse or family. We conclude with a discussion of why researchers might be hesitant to adopt the TTT methodology.     

The practice of collective bargaining in the private sector in Quebec (Canada): the changing ‘rules of the game’

Drawing on 45 semi‐structured interviews with union negotiators active in the Quebec private sector, this article shows that local bargaining practices, despite their plurality, have tended to change following major trends. It also reveals, more fundamentally, a redefinition of the ‘rules of the game’. The transformation and stability of these social rules, which are much more focused on the needs of employers, have tended to weaken collective bargaining as a tool for industrial democracy.