Managerial compensation

We review the existing literature on managerial compensation, with particular reference to the two contrasting views about its main driver. On the one hand, managerial compensation is seen to be the result of a market-based mechanism which ensures that managers have adequate incentives to maximize shareholder value. On the other hand, it is regarded to be a means whereby self-serving executives skim corporate profits and expropriate shareholders. We find that most of the existing literature supports the latter view as executives tend to benefit from windfall earnings and are able to extract rents in the presence of weak corporate governance.     

Dynamic factors in the presence of blocks

Macroeconometric data often come under the form of large panels of time series, themselves decomposing into smaller but still quite large subpanels or blocks. We show how the dynamic factor analysis method proposed in Forni et al. (2000), combined with the identification method of Hallin and Liška (2007), allows for identifying and estimating joint and block-specific common factors. This leads to a more sophisticated analysis of the structures of dynamic interrelations within and between the blocks in such datasets, along with an informative decomposition of explained variances. The method is illustrated with an analysis of a dataset of Industrial Production Indices for France, Germany, and Italy.     

Diversification: a road to inefficiency in product innovations?

Motivated by recent empirical observations made in industries such as the automobile industry, this paper employs an agent-based industry simulation model to examine the strategic relationship between product diversification strategies and some aspects of the product innovation strategy of a single producer. In particular, it is established that an increase in the average degree of product diversification in an industry increases the incentive for a producer to reduce the time to market for innovations at the expense of product quality. However, if all firms adapt their strategies according to these incentives, this results in a severe loss of average firm profits in the industry and also to a reduction in consumer surplus. It is then studied how the strength of this dilemma depends on several parameters describing the market structure and patent policy.     

An operational structure for clarity in ecosystem service values

Analyses used to value ecosystem services often confuse final ecosystem services with ecological functions that provide indirect benefit. Typologies of ecosystem services, such as that developed by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, do not ameliorate these challenges. Among the causes of ambiguity in classifying values associated with intermediate versus final ecosystem services are (1) the lack of simple, broadly applicable guidelines to assist natural and social scientists in deriving consistent and replicable classifications, and (2) attempts to define universal typologies of final services that apply to all beneficiaries. This paper presents an operational mechanism for determining whether a biophysical feature, quantity, or quality represents a final ecosystem service for an inclusive suite of beneficiaries. It is designed for straightforward application by those without expertise in natural or social sciences, and can be used within existing typologies. Illustrations of the structure demonstrate how the resulting classifications avert double counting and other ambiguities.