Does trust favor macroeconomic stability?

This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroeconomic volatility. An illustrative model rationalizes the relationship between trust and volatility. In this model, trust relaxes credit constraints and diminishes investment’s procyclicality. I provide empirical evidence for the basic predictions of the model. Then, I show that higher trust is associated with lower macroeconomic volatility in a cross section of countries. This relationship persists when various covariates are taken into account. I use inherited trust of Americans as an instrumental variable for trust in their origin country to overcome reverse causality concerns. Using changes in inherited trust over the 20th century, I do not find clear evidence that increasing trust is also associated with decreasing volatility across time at the country level.     

Transportation Costs and US Manufacturing FDI

In empirical models of foreign direct investment (FDI), distance is most often used to proxy for transportation costs and other pure‐trade costs. Given that distance is time invariant but transportation costs are not, this approach is less than satisfactory when actual transportation costs rise and fall over time.The contribution of this work is to explicitly control for transportation costs and thereby better understand their impact on FDI. We explore the impact of shipping costs on total US FDI stocks abroad, manufacturing stocks and service stocks using measures of sea‐shipping and air‐shipping costs in a Hausman–Taylor model that controls for endogeneity and allows for time‐invariant variables such as distance. We find that transportation costs have a positive and statistically significant relationship with US total and manufacturing FDI, suggesting a substitute relationship between FDI and trade flows consistent with horizontal MNE activity. As one would expect, these costs are insignificant for service stocks.     

Post-restructuring performance in Japan

Peek and Rosengren (2005) showed that after the end of the bubble economy era in Japan, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in “evergreening”. Inoue et al. (2008) also showed that, compared to out-of-court settlements in the United States, agreements on out-of-court restructuring are attained more easily in Japan. However, widespread forbearance by banks and affiliated companies in addressing the needs of distressed firms indicated a serious weakness of banks and affiliated companies in instituting discipline. This is the first empirical study to examine the performance of Japanese firms that experienced out-of-court restructuring in Japan from January 1990, when the bubble economy burst, to March 2005, when the Koizumi Cabinet declared the bad debt problems of major firms to be resolved. Our results show that important biases permitted deeply unprofitable firms to survive in Japan. This finding is similar to research by Hotchkiss (1995), who analyzed post-restructuring performance in the United States. We also find that out-of-court restructurings of troubled firms in Japan were less effective in improving profitability than restructurings under Chapter 11 in the United States. However, we find that restructurings associated with new capital injections and new outside management are more likely to lead to genuine improvement in financial performance.     

Information aggregation in experimental asset markets in the presence of a manipulator

We study with the help of a laboratory experiment the conditions under which an uninformed manipulator—a robot trader that unconditionally buys several shares of a common value asset in the beginning of a trading period and unwinds this position later on—is able to induce higher asset prices. We find that the average price is significantly higher in the presence of the manipulator if and only if the asset takes the lowest possible value and insiders receive perfect information about the true value of the asset. It is also evidenced that the robot trader makes trading gains. Finally, both uninformed and partially informed traders may suffer from the presence of the robot.     

Identifying the age profile of patent citations: new estimates of knowledge diffusion

Previous research studies the age profile of patent citations to learn about knowledge flows over time. However, identification is problematic because of the collinearity between application year, citation year, and patent age. We show empirically that a patent's ‘citation clock’ does not start until it issues, and propose a highly flexible identification strategy that uses the lag between application and grant as a source of exogenous variation. We examine the potential bias if our assumptions are incorrect, and discuss extensions into other research areas. Finally, we use our method to re‐examine prior results on citation age profiles of patents from different technological fields and application year cohorts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The link between board composition and board objectives: an empirical analysis on Flemish non‐profit schools

Flemish non‐profit schools have no legally imposed composition rules with respect to their board of directors. Hence, large variation exists in their size and composition. We argue that these differences in board composition can result in different policies followed by the board. To empirically test this hypothesis we question the board's chairpersons of Flemish non‐profit schools about the objectives set forward by the board. Ordered probit regressions on the importance attached to different educational objectives provide support for our hypothesis and thus alert policy makers to account for the linkages between objectives and board characteristics when formulating legislation with respect to school board composition. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.